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Efficient capital markets are essential for market-based economies and their growth. Eco-
nomic growth is one of the most important factors that enable societies to improve their 
citizens well-being in multiple ways, for an example increased resources allocated to ed-
ucation and healthcare enabling enhanced outcomes in quality of education and 
healthcare. Equity ownership provides a way for individuals and groups for partaking in 
the economic growth of individual companies via dividends and increase in equity market 
value. This research aims to answer the following questions: What is the ownership struc-
ture of Finnish public companies like? How does this ownership structure evolve over 
time? Do investor groups have differing, systematic tendencies from one and another in 
terms of their buying and selling decisions related to the case companies? 
To answer these questions, a multiple case, longitudinal (1995-2016) study was con-
ducted for seven Finnish publicly listed companies differing in multiple variables includ-
ing, but not limited to, operating industry, market capitalization, global reach and size of 
operations. The data used in the research was a combination of publicly available market 
data through NASDAQ, operator of Helsinki Stock Exchange and non-public trading and 
ownership data obtained from Euroclear for research purposes. All nominee sharehold-
ings were excluded from the data analysis. Scientific sources for literature review were 
obtained through various finance and economic theory publications. This review of past 
literature enabled identification of trends in investors’ market behavior as well as assess-
ment of ownership structure and corporate control in an international environment. 
Results indicate that the Finnish case companies have varying ownership structures. Own-
ership structures have a tendency to remain rather stable over time. Household investors 
tend to exhibit strong contrarian trading patterns. Institutional investors tend to follow 
both momentum and contrarian trading strategy. Investor sophistication seems to be in-
versely correlated with the degree of contrarian-based trading. These findings are 
supported by past research.  
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Tehokkaat pääomamarkkinat ovat elintärkeä osa markkinataloutta ja talouden kasvua. 
Talouskasvu on yksi tärkeimmistä vaikuttajista yhteiskunnan kykyyn parantaa 
kansalaisten hyvinvointia monilla tavoilla, kuten ohjaamalla resursseja koulutukseen ja 
terveydenhuoltoon. Korkealaatuinen koulutus ja terveydenhuollon kehitys ovat 
esimerkkejä tästä hyvinvoinnista. Osakkeiden omistaminen antaa kansalaisille ja 
erilaisille ryhmille mahdollisuuden osallistua yksittäisten yritysten tuottamaan 
talouskasvuun omistusten tuomien osinkojen sekä osakkeiden hintakehityksen myötä. 
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan seuraaviin kysymyksiin: Millainen omistajarakenne 
pörssilistatuilla, suomalaisilla yrityksillä on? Miten tämä omistusrakenne kehittyy ajan 
funktiona? Onko eri sijoittajaryhmillä systemaattisia tendenssejä osakkeiden osto- ja 
myyntipäätösten osalta tapausyritysten suhteen? 
Jotta näihin kysymyksiin pystyttäisiin vastaamaan, toteutettiin seitsemän suomalaisen 
yritystapauksen pitkittäistutkimus (1995-2016). Yritykset erosivat toisistaan monella 
mittarilla, mukaan lukien esimerkiksi teollisuusala, markkina-arvo, kansainvälistymisen 
aste ja toimintojen suuruusluokka. Tutkimuksessa käytetty data on yhdistelmä julkisesti 
saatavilla olevaa markkinadataa NASDAQ:lta, Helsingin pörssin operaattorilta sekä ei-
julkisesti saatavilla olevaa omistus- ja kaupankäyntidataa Euroclear:ltä 
tutkimustarkoituksiin. Hallintarekisterissä olevia osakeomistuksia ei ole otettu huomioon 
data-analyysissä. Tieteelliset lähteet kirjallisuuskatsaukseen on saatu lukuisista talous- ja 
rahoitusalan tieteellisistä julkaisuista. Kirjallisuuskatsaus mahdollisti sijoittajien 
käyttäytymistrendien identifioimisen ja kansainvälisen katsauksen omistajarakenteeseen 
ja yrityksien määräysvaltaan.  
Tulosten perusteella kyseisillä suomalaisilla yrityksillä on hyvin erilaiset 
omistajarakenteet. Omistajarakenteet pysyvät tyypillisesti kohtalaisen stabiileina ajan 
kuluessa. Institutionaaliset sijoittajat käyttävät sekä momentum-, että vastavirran 
strategioita ja kotitaloussijoittajilla on selkeä taipumus vastavirran strategian 
seuraamiseen. Sijoittajan ammattimaisuus näyttää korreloivan käänteisesti vastavirran 
strategian voimakkuuden kanssa. Historialliset tutkimukset tukevat tämän tutkimuksen 
löydöksiä.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
The stock market has provided companies an opportunity for companies to raise capital 
from the public for business ventures for decades and in certain markets for over a cen-
tury. Simultaneously the public has had the opportunity to participate in various busi-
nesses as owners through ownership of stock certificates. Stock ownership can be used 
as a way to align the interest of business owners and managers where stock certificates 
entitle the owners to cash flows associated with the business – effectively aligning the 
owners’ interests as they share common risks for both the upside and downside in the 
company and it’s business prospects. 
The actions in the market, especially during ‘boom and bust’ –cycles, has attracted major 
interest from all major media outlets and this has enabled the market to become a common 
subject of public discussion. A large proportion of all company ownership lies within 
major institutional investors such as pension funds and various investment vehicles where 
groups of decision-makers have great power over capital allocation – this can be for the 
benefit or detriment of the providers of the capital whether that be governments, high net 
worth individuals or regular tax payers. Therefore the capital allocation decisions deserve 
attention and critique from media outlets and the public. 
Every ‘boom and bust’ cycle can result in a major redistribution of wealth due to the 
major volatility or swings in value of individual companies and the stock market as a 
whole. The financial crisis that began in 2008 resulted in one such redistribution of wealth 
and it is interesting to find out, who the winners and losers were and by studying the 
related effects to understand how such outcome came to be.  
One can argue that the ‘boom and bust’ –cycles are inherent characteristics of a market-
driven economy and it might be impossible to get rid of them completely by legislation. 
If it is so, society must critically look at the decision-making processes and outcomes of 
the past and look for cues as in how to reduce downside risks and increase upside risks of 
the public – especially when the majority of all households’ pension funds are allocated 
by a small group of investors who are in control of the capital allocation decisions of 
major public and private pension funds. 
The relation between ownership structure and short-term focus as well as incentives built 
into the capital structure of modern economies are matters of real concern (Graves & 
Waddock 1990). This concern, related to large institutional ownership of companies, has 
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been brought into attention almost 30 years ago, however the same issues still present 
themselves in the marketplace. This should grab the attention of everyone who assumes 
that the pension funds will be able to take care of their liabilities, as in pension payments, 
in the upcoming decades. Erenburg et al. (2016) found evidence that activist public pen-
sion managers have misaligned incentives or their actions are influenced by hubris . If by 
policy and/or practice Finnish pension funds were able to avoid the issue of short-term 
focus and the suboptimal rates of returns associated with it, the system might be able to 
function with greater efficiency and a decrease of long-term risks associated with the 
growing amount of retirees compared to the amount of people in the work force. 
Investments are a major driver of economy growth in all market-based countries. Accord-
ing to Keynes’ economic theory savings equal investments. OECD defines net household 
savings as the subtraction of household consumption from household disposable income, 
plus the change in net equity of households in pension funds. OECD data shows that 
during the 21st century Finnish household savings rate has been dismal ranging between 
the maximum of 3.38 % in 2009 and the minimum of -1.43 % in 2016, averaging 1.27 % 
for the years 2000 to 2016. During the same time period China’s average savings rate is 
above 33 %. This is why investment quality and the related decision-making in Finland 
is of utmost importance.The small savings rate requires that current capital employed, 
mainly by pension funds, must be allocated efficiently in order for Finland to continue 
economic growth in the future.  
 
1.2 Objective of the study 
The objectives of the study relate to case companies ownership structure, their evolve-
ment over time and investor group behavior. These objectives are compressed into fo-
cused research questions. The three questions posed by this research are the following: 
What is the ownership structure of Finnish public companies like?  
How does this ownership structure evolve over time?  
Do investor groups have differing, systematic tendencies from one and another in terms 
of their buying and selling decisions related to the case companies? 
The most important objective of this study is to shed light into the case companies’ past 
ownership structures and their development over time. Past research findings and lessons 
are to be leveraged in order to understand the ownership structure and the dynamics 
around it. The three major areas of interest of this study are investor behavior, ownership 
structure and corporate control of public companies in the Finnish market.  
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In order to gain understanding of the selected companies’ ownership structure it is essen-
tial to first obtain a view on which groups own equity in the company in question and the 
quantity of such ownership. Through the utilization of ownership structure snapshots over 
time, historical data of the companies’ ownership structure is to be presented in this re-
search. This might offer a glimpse into differing ownership structures and therefore dif-
ferences in corporate control in a selection of listed Finnish companies. Nominee share-
holdings are excluded from all data analysis and therefore the charts and tables presented 
in Chapter 5 will reflect only non-nominee shareholdings. This will not give a thorough 
picture of corporate control, however the purpose will be to shed light into non-nominee 
ownership structures of the case companies. 
A more focused area that this study aims to research more in depth is the investor behavior 
of different types of investors especially those representing the households as a whole and 
institutional investor groups. In a zero-sum game there is always a loser and a winner to 
a trade and to look at aggregate totals of trades and portfolios is to look at the market with 
a broad lense. To gain a better view of the investor groups’ behavior this study will look 
into the published research and market actions of the groups in order to detect trends and 
biases and to analyze and understand these trends and biases. 
Through a monthly data analysis of investor groups’ behavior within the selected case 
companies equity ownership, it is possible to look at long-term trends in capital allocation 
decisions by different owner groups with a focus on household investors and institutional 
investors. A key question to be answered by the data and it’s rigorous analysis is how past 
returns affect different investors’ buy and sell decisions and are there any identifiable 
trends, tendencies or strategies for each investor group. 
What this analysis might enable are two separate, yet intertwined ideas. First is that the 
society and investors could have a critical look at past decision-making and self-reflect 
on decision-making processes in different investor groups. Any finding that might help 
an investor, whether that be a pension fund manager or a private individual, improve 
his/her decision-making process that would result in an increment in expected returns in 
the marketplace would benefit the individual in the case of a private investor and society 
as a whole in the case of a public/private pension fund manager. In theory, such an im-
provement in everyone’s decision-making process would result in zero gain, however it 
is a far cry from reality that each individual would have an ability to get rid of his or her 
biases. All societies should have a major interest in improving decision-making processes 
of the major institutions to enable a more efficient system to the citizens. 
Second, this might give an individual a real advantage or edge in the marketplace over 
the other marketplace participants. This idea is fascinating, yet extremely difficult and 
cumbersome to implement. Acknowledging first, then understanding and thirdly exploit-
ing systemic biases is something that companies in general have a requirement to strive 
for in the competitive game of capitalism. This study aims to perform such an analysis of 
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historic behavioral biases as to provide information of value to market participants which 
might enable them to improve their competitive advantage in the  game of capitalism. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This thesis integrates information from various scientific views of companies and inves-
tors and their linkage through ownership structure of companies. Companies are viewed 
through the lense of the owners in the system of capitalism. The main focus of this study 
is on the data of ownership structures and changes within the structures, however to take 
a critical look at such data one must provide a framework for analysis. Such framework 
is provided through a global look at scientific studies done on corporate control, owner-
ship structure and investor group behavior and the dynamic interplay of these factors in 
the marketplace. 
Chapter 2 will provide a look at scientific literature done on corporate control and own-
ership structure of companies. Here, an analysis of different ownership types will be pro-
vided with guidance from history and historical data. How the ownership structure affects 
company performance and company value will be looked at. The performance and value 
of a company have quantitative metrics, yet there exists a qualitative framework for value 
and performance as well. A quantitative analysis might result in a completely different 
result than a qualitative analysis and these two, quantitative and qualitative analysis are 
necessary in order to reach a conclusion on both performance and value. Another two 
factors in the equation are company management and strategy, which affect each of the 
abovementioned – as well as ownership structure also has an effect on company manage-
ment and strategy. These dynamics will be looked at thoroughly in Chapter 2 with multi-
ple, different viewpoints provided by past research. 
Chapter 3 defines and separates different investor groups from one and another. By 
searching past scientific literature and past research findings, this study aims to study the 
differences between the investor groups with a focus on household and institutional in-
vestors. While the two are separated for the study, these two groups are not completely 
separate as many professional managers will also have personal investments outside of 
their managed fund. Therefore there exists major overlap in investor groups, however 
sizeable effort is put into analyzing investors, their behavior and characteristics. Histori-
cal data and scientific studies in this field are ubiquitous and therefore this study has an 
objective to perform an efficient, yet thorough, analysis of past research in the field to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive picture of investor groups and their characteris-
tics. 
The core of Chapter 4 is about the research methods and data used in this study. Here, the 
selected cases will be outlined and introduced to the reader. The basic rationale for the 
case selection is provided and the data set used in the research will be described. After-
wards, the methodology of this research will be presented with a focus on establishing 
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the methods for evaluating different investor groups trading behavior by a momentum 
score variable. This variable will be used in two distinct analyses, the High/Low analysis 
and the Monthly analysis. These will be explained in Chapter 5.  
The data analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. All exceptions and adjustments made to 
the raw data will be presented to the reader to give the analysis transparency as the ma-
jority of the case companies’ data required adjustments for various reasons that will be 
explained. Next the High/Low analysis and Monthly analysis, respectively, will be pre-
sented. The results of the research will be outlined and presented in Chapter 6. Finally, 
Chapter 7 will provide the conclusion of the study. Discussion about meeting the objec-
tives and the limitations of the study will be discussed and future research areas that were 
identified during the process of the study will be presented.  
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2. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE & CORPORATE 
CONTROL IN LITERATURE 
This chapter will look into different types of ownership structures and the corporate con-
trol associated with those. A historical outlook will provide points of reference for the 
study in Chapter 2.1, where multiple countries’ ownership structures for companies will 
be presented. After the historical outlook we will demonstrate more depth in ownership 
structure and corporate control through past research into associated trends and effects. 
The first function of the company’s owners, capital allocation, will be further discussed 
in Chapter 2.2 in terms of performance and value and the second function, exerting con-
trol, will be further discussed in Chapter 2.3. These two functions are further described 
below.  
Owners are responsible for two important functions, first where to allocate their capital 
(given the scarcity of available resources) with incentives aligned as to maximize future 
cash flows & asset appreciation and second how to govern or control their investments to 
maximize efficiency e.g. pressuring weak-performing companies’ management for 
changes. Exiting, or liquidating an investment is an alternative option for the owners in-
stead of using their voting privilege to make changes with the goal of increasing effi-
ciency. Given that institutional investors often hold large blocks of shares, an exit might 
not be feasible due to the deteriorating effect on asset value caused by liquidating a large 
ownership position. This can, in effect, encourage corporate activism and increase insti-
tutional investors’ influence on corporate strategy. (Hoskisson et al. 2002) 
Companies ownership structure, performance, value, management and strategy are inter-
related with each other and therefore Chapters 2.1 through 2.3 will have some necessary 
overlap. Multiple paragraphs will reference other parts of the related issues throughout 
the Chapter 2 in order to provide a clear-cut and synthesized view of interplay and dy-
namics of the ownership structure, company performance, value, management and strat-
egy. 
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2.1 Ownership structures & corporate control 
Several different ownership structures for companies exist and in this study a categoriza-
tion into six categories by Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) will be used as follows: 
 Dispersed ownership 
 Dominant ownership 
 Family-owned 
 Foreign-owned 
 Cooperative 
 Government-owned 
Dispersed ownership here means that no single stockholder controls over 20 % of the 
shares or voting rights. In dominant ownership a company has a stockholder who has over 
20 and less than 50 % of shares or voting rights. In family, foreign and government owned 
companies the respective owner has the majority of the shares or voting rights. Coopera-
tives are registered as cooperatives or majority owned by cooperatives. Concentrating 
ownership is the most direct way of aligning the cash flows and control rights of outside 
investors and the free rider problem can be avoided by having a substantial minority 
shareholder as the shareholder will have the incentive to collect information and monitor 
the management according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Poterba et al. (1995) concluded 
that individuals, or households, ultimately own all corporate equity whether it is through 
a financial intermediary such as a pension fund or directly via direct stock ownership.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) theorized that by increasing the diffusion of ownership, the 
owners of the company have a greater incentive to shirk, creating benefits by giving the 
owner the ability to use his time and energy elsewhere while creating a disadvantage of 
poorer performance by the firm due to the lack of attention from the owner. They con-
cluded that: “the more concentrated is ownership, the greater the degree to which benefits 
and costs are borne by  the sole owner”. This results in owners neglecting some tasks of 
ownership, for an example neglect over poor management in need of change. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) studied the structure of corporate ownership and the related causes and 
consequences and found out that: 
 The higher price of a given fraction of the company should reduce the degree to 
which ownership is concentrated 
 A given degree of control requires a smaller share of the company the larger is the 
company 
 Larger companies realize a smaller overall cost than do smaller companies with a 
more diffuse ownership structure 
The ownership patterns of large corporations have been found by Porta et al. (1999) to be 
relatively stable and the largest firms in the richest economies tend to have most widely 
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dispersed ownership. Their research found that few firms tend to be widely held, except 
for economies with very good shareholder protection, and the control tends to lay within 
either the government or families. Surprising result of their research was that by far the 
most dominant form of controlling ownership was by families, not banks or corporations. 
Often, the controlling shareholders may exert excess power over the company relative to 
their rights to the cash flows primarily through management participation and the use of 
pyramids. Another type of excess control over cash flow rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)  
is found in companies with different classes of stock where the one-share one-vote prin-
ciple is forgone or pyramid structures are used, often giving controlling shareholders, 
typically families or governments, excess voting rights. (Porta et al. 1999) 
Helwege et al. (2007) conducted research about initial public offerings in the US and 
ownership structure evolvement after the IPOs of the companies, respectively. They 
found that the time from the IPO to diffuse ownership is swift, in half of the companies 
they studied they found that insiders held less than 20 percent of cash flow rights after the 
IPO. For the companies under study, Helwege et al. (2007) found that on average share 
sales by insiders were as important as new equity offerings in explaining the decrease of 
insider ownership. In their data set, shares issued in the primary offerings and mergers/ac-
quisitions were only a fraction of the increase in the share count – this might be explained 
partly by the prevalence and importance of stock option compensation in the US. 
Evidence from Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) research support the view that the market 
does succeed in bringing forth ownership structures of approximate appropriateness for 
the companies that they serve, whether that be diffused or concentrated ownership struc-
ture. They listed circumstances that affect companies’ ownership structure as economies 
of scale, regulation and the stability of the environment that the company operates in. The 
actual differences in ownership structures between countries are presented in Table 1 and 
these differences might partly be explained by a theory of path-dependent ownership, as 
ownership structures develop differently over time in different societies and environ-
ments.   
Kirchmaier and Grant (2005) found that ownership structures in the largest European 
economies have considerable variance and that there exists a significant impact to firm 
performance due to ownership structure. One of their most significant results was that 
company ownership structures are path-dependent and they are shaped by powerful in-
terest groups in manners which may not achieve the optimal level of efficiency for the 
society. Their research findings include that European ownership structures are often in-
efficient which contradicts the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) have argued that government-owned, or state control, is a separate category of 
ownership due to the fact that the government uses these companies to pursue political 
objectives while the citizens pay for the losses of such companies.  
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“Current European ownership structures are a function of the complex interaction of 
history, national regulation, strength of institutional investors and individual/family 
wealth preferences, constraints and psychology. The balancing of these interests through 
the political process at country level has been a prime determinant of current corporate 
structures… These structures are far from efficient… Europe may create significant value 
from changing its ownership structures.” (Kirchmaier & Grant, 2005) 
 
Table 1. Ownership of the hundred largest companies in twelve European nations by 
Pedersen & Thomsen (1997). 
There is a major nation effect, meaning nations differ in their ownership structures sig-
nificantly and the appearing differences may be explained by historical, institutional and 
geographical differences between countries affecting their economic development over 
time (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) argued that Finland’s 
late industrialization may explain why the government has been given a larger role espe-
cially in forest products to play catch up with other countries economic development. 
Their study also found out that the industry that the company in question operates in has 
a significant effect over ownership structure – for an example government playing a larger 
role in public services such as electricity production and airlines.  
Bolton and Von Thadden (1998a) found there to be little variation across countries in the 
capital structure of small companies, however the problem of inducing more effective 
investor control for large companies has been solved very differently across nations. They 
provide examples from the United States and the United Kingdom, where ownership is 
widely dispersed, turnover is high and investor control is exerted through the threat of 
takeovers, contrasting with practices in such as Germany, France and Japan where own-
Dispersed 
Ownership
Dominant 
Ownership
Family-
Owned
Foreign-
Owned Cooperative
Government-
Owned
Austria 0 7 25 38 10 20
Belgium 4 20 6 61 3 6
Denmark 10 9 30 23 17 11
Finland 12 25 23 11 10 19
France 16 28 15 16 3 22
Germany 9 30 26 22 3 10
Great Britain 61 11 6 18 1 3
Italy 0 22 20 29 0 29
Netherlands 23 16 7 34 13 7
Norway 6 14 29 19 19 13
Spain 6 22 8 45 5 14
Sweden 4 31 18 14 12 21
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ership is more concentrated, turnover is lower and investor control is exerted by the larg-
est shareholders and debtholders. Fundamental question regarding ownership concentra-
tion is, whether it is best to have a large block shareholder continuously exert control over 
the management or alternatively have diffuse ownership and rely on market forces to 
intervene in managerial decision-making by creating ownership concentration whenever 
such intervention is deemed necessary by the market participants. (Bolton & Von Thad-
den, 1998a.) 
2.2 Implications on performance and value 
Berle and Means (1932) argued that there is a potential conflict of interest between cor-
porate managers and dispersed shareholders when managers do not have an ownership 
interest in the company. According to McConnell and Servaes (1990), corporate value is 
a function of the structure of equity ownership and their results suggest that institutional 
ownership “reinforces the positive effect of insider ownership on corporate value”. They 
did not find a significant relation between corporate performance and a single, dominant 
shareholder.  Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no evidence to support the hypothesis 
that differences in ownership structure result in systematic variations in observed compa-
nies’ performances. Their findings support the narrative that the market is successful in 
bringing forth ownership structures, which are appropriate to the firms that they serve – 
ownership structures vary with the company and market dynamics, particularly in regard 
to regulation, scale of economies and the environment that the company operates in. The 
study of Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) also found no relation between insider ownership 
and company value. 
Cho (1998) found evidence that company value affects ownership structure but not vice 
versa. This calls into question whether ownership structure is exogenously determined, 
which has been an assumption used in some studies.  Cho (1998) also found a significant 
relation between insider ownership and company value. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
found that in large European companies the relationship between ownership concentra-
tion and economic performance is nonlinear and as ownership concentration grows be-
yond a certain level it will lead into entrenchment and this has adverse effects on company 
performance. Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) concluded in their other paper that there is a 
significant nation effect in corporate ownership and they partly explained it with institu-
tional differences between countries.  
Coffee (1991) argued that large blocks are necessarily illiquid due to the fact that an at-
tempt to sell a large block of shares would be perceived in the marketplace as a signal 
that the seller possesses adverse information. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) also argued 
that the liquidity of ownership does effect time preferences of owners while larger owners 
can not necessarily sell their shares at market prices due to their selling behavior affecting 
the share prices. Often real, yet small, discounts to market value in large block trades 
support the argumentation by Coffee, Zeckhauser and Pound. Bolton and Von Thadden 
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(1998b) described issues with the build-up and dismantling of large blocks of ownership 
as the disclosure requirements for crossing critical ownership thresholds, often 5 and 10 
%, may be different for building and dismantling such blocks. Another major factor to 
take into account, especially when examining European companies where government 
plays a larger role as an owner of equities than in the US, was brought up by Shepherd 
(1989): The identity of the owners influences the priorities of the companies in question 
– for an example companies owned by the government will be expected to follow political 
objectives instead of private objectives, supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Often 
social goals and shareholder value maximization goals will be very different from each 
other, sometimes being complete opposites.  
Gompers and Metrick (2001) found that the level of institutional ownership in an equity 
can help forecast the respective equity’s rate of return and the predictive power is the 
result from demand shocks resulting from the compositional shift in ownership from in-
dividuals towards institutions. They found that the abovementioned compositional shift 
results in higher demand for larger market capitalization companies, which results in 
higher prices, and lower demand for smaller market capitalization companies, resulting 
in lower prices. This trend was observed by Gompers and Metrick (2001) in the US stock 
market and could be extended to other markets if the shift towards concentration in insti-
tutional ownership is similar in other markets. Research by Erenburg et al. (2016) found 
that activist pension funds’ shareholdings, to the contrary of the Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) research, are negatively correlated with subsequent company performance.  
Erenburg et al. (2016) found evidence that supports the view that institutional investors’ 
threat to sell can align managerial incentives with those of the equity holders, or stock-
holders. They found that institutional short-term holdings contrast with long-term hold-
ings in that they are negatively related to failure and positively related to subsequent per-
formance which they state as an indication of the important monitoring role that institu-
tions, which trade actively, possess. In their data they found that high long-term owner-
ship was negatively associated with subsequent failure while it is not significantly related 
to acquisition or any of their performance metrics. (Erenburg et al. 2016.) 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe a fundamental problem that arises from controlling 
or dominant shareholders: the large investors represent their own interests which may 
differ from those of other investors, company managers and employees enabling them to 
redistribute wealth in efficient and inefficient ways from the others. Therefore a control-
ling shareholder may in selected cases actually become a hindrance to company perfor-
mance and value creation for other shareholders. Kirchmaier and Grant (2005) expressed 
that Europe’s equities could create value via optimization of companies’ ownership struc-
tures.  Examples of behavior where insiders may divert funds were discussed by Shleifer 
and Vishny in their 1997 paper as outright theft, dilution of other shareholders through 
share issues to insiders, excessive salaries, sales of company assets to themselves or com-
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panies owned by the insiders. Bae et al. (2002) reported such behavior in Korean compa-
nies, where insiders have benefited from below-market price share issues at the cost of 
minority shareholders. Contrasting the above evidence, the analysis of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) found that large shareholders increase expected profits and this effect is 
correlated with the size of the ownership, however large shareholders may be hard for the 
company to keep. Integrity of large shareholders is next to impossible to research – the 
abovementioned papers obviously compare large shareholders with improper and proper 
integrity, respectively. Daily and Dollinger (1992) and Kang (2000) have suggested that 
family firms represent one of the most effective solutions to the agency problem in or-
ganizational governance. On the other hand family firms present another potential issue 
where family insiders might divert company resources or assets from their most efficient 
use causing the outside shareholders excessive expense while providing private benefits 
to the family insiders (Bae et al. 2002, Gao & Kling, 2008). 
“The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-
partnery frequently watch their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, the have apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such  
a company.” 
      -Adam Smith, the Wealth of Nations (1776) 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) described agency costs arising from the failure to align the 
interests of the company managers with the shareholders in practice as on-the-job perks, 
shirking and making self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder 
wealth. Agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as follows: 
i. Monitoring expenses by the principal 
ii. Bonding expenses by the agent 
iii. Residual loss, 
Where residual loss is defined as the dollar equivalent of loss in welfare experienced by 
the principal due to the fact that the agent’s final decisions diverge from the optimal de-
cisions in the perspective of the principal’s welfare maximization. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) concluded that agency costs are true costs (which will always hinder a company’s 
performance) and although public companies have shortcomings, “the corporation has 
thus far survived the market test against potential alternatives”.  
Research by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) provide supporting evidence to the prediction by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that agency costs are higher in companies with less than 10 
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percent manager ownership and the costs increase when the manager ownership de-
creases. Ang, An and Zhang (2013) stated that institutional monitoring limits managers’ 
extraction of the company’s cash flows, thereby reducing agency costs and company-
specific risk. Cole and Lin (2000) studied small, non-public companies and their other 
findings related to agency costs were: 
i. They are significantly higher in companies where an outsider manages the com-
pany compared to one where an insider has control 
ii. Agency costs are inversely related to the manager’s ownership stake 
iii. Agency costs increase with the number of non-manager shareholders 
iv. Agency costs are lower when greater monitoring by banks is present 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) estimated that the cumulative stock returns during crisis period 
of companies, in which managers have high levels of control and have separated their 
control from cash flow ownership, are 10 to 20 percentage points lower than those of 
other firms.  Higher long-run underperformance of bidder companies, in case of takeo-
vers, are associated with short-term institutional shareholder ownership according to Gas-
par, Massa & Matos research (2005). According to the research of Bethel and Liebeskind 
(1993) there exists reasonable evidence that institutional owners support the managerial 
goal of growth instead of the shareholders’ goal of maximizing value. Cho (1998) found 
that investment affects company value, which affects ownership structure but the reverse 
was found to be not true – therefore ownership might not be an effective incentive for 
inducing managers to pursue value-maximizing decision-making in company invest-
ments. This casts doubt whether stock grants and option grants provide executives with 
strong incentives to make decisions that maximize shareholder value (Cho, 1998). 
A tendency for value loss resulting from increased diversification was found by Amihud 
and Lev (1999) while more focused companies tend to increase company value more so 
than diversified companies. They found evidence that diversifying mergers and acquisi-
tions reduce shareholder value. They stated that the this diversification strategy is one of 
the detrimental effects caused by agency problems, which will be discussed more in 
Chapter 2.3. Research of bidder companies in case of mergers have shown that the long-
term performance of bidders are on average non-positive and the non-positive returns are 
primarily seen in acquisitions that are paid in stock, contrary to cash and debt, and in the 
case of glamour acquirers (Gaspar et al. 2005).  
If the identity of the controlling shareholder has an affect on company objectives and 
strategy (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), a following hypothesis could be constructed: 
Ownership structure, especially the identity of the controlling or dominating shareholder 
group, will affect companies’ strategic objectives and decisions resulting in differences 
in rates of growth and profitability. The aforementioned will ultimately be reflected in 
company performance and value across different types of controlling or dominating 
shareholder groups. 
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2.3 Implications on management and strategy 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders perform the task of monitoring 
the management and looking for ways to improve the company. According to Thomsen 
and Pedersen (2000) top management has a personal interest in diversification at the com-
pany level due to risk aversion related to employment, expense preference and empire 
building, a well-studied phenomenon in top management behavior. They argue that the 
identities of power-wielding shareholders have implications for their objectives and there-
fore affect the way in which they exercise their power reflecting into the company and its 
strategic decisions relating to profit goals, dividends, capital structure and growth rates. 
According to economic theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983) the liquidity of ownership affects 
corporate investment due to differing time preferences of the owners. Amihud and Lev 
(1999) outline ways for shareholders to align the managers incentives better with those 
of the shareholders by performance-based incentive pay and options which should in-
crease the managers’ propensity to take risks, counteracting the risk aversion described 
by Thomsen and Pedersen (2000).  Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) challenge the 
research of Amihud and Lev and various agency theory researchers with their study find-
ing no evidence that agency theory would extend to the strategic behaviors of manage-
ment.  
“In well functioning markets, competition drives the efficient redeployment of assets.” 
(Erenburg et al. 2016) 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) monitoring shareholders have an opportunity to 
improve the company’s operating strategy and sometimes they must replace the current 
management in order to maximize profits and value. This threat to incumbents should 
provide incentive(s) for the management to pursue strategies in the shareholders’ inter-
ests. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) found evidence that when the need for restructuring 
arises, large blockholders play a major role in monitoring and influencing company strat-
egy in cases where the management is reluctant to the idea of restructuring. An and Zhang 
(2013) found that transient institutional investors’ ownership stake are positively related 
to stock price synchronicity and crash risk, while the contrary relation for both was found 
for dedicated institutional investors. They explained the latter by dedicated institutional 
investors’ strong incentives for monitoring due to large ownership stakes and long invest-
ment horizons and the former by the tendency of transient institutional investors to trade 
rather than monitor. An and Zhang (2013) further added, that institutional monitoring 
reduces crash risk by mitigating managerial bad-news hoarding, which can result in stock 
price crashes when an amount of accumulated bad news is finally released to the share-
holders as a whole.  
A survey conducted by Graves and Waddock (1990) in 1987 to 400 chief executives in 
the US suggested that CEOs feel short-term pressure from institutions and the CEOs have 
a belief that due to the pressure various industries are taking a short-view on developing 
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their strategies. In the survey, 58 percent responded that institutional owners were one of 
the principal sources of short-term performance pressure, while 70 percent responded 
positively when asked if their industries were justifiably criticized for focusing on tomor-
row’s stock price or next quarter’s earnings. In terms of institutional owners’ influence 
and changes in it during the past 5 years 98 percent of the executives responded that 
institutions had either gained or kept their influence. (Graves & Waddock, 1990)  
Hill and Snell (1989) state that companies acting in the interests of shareholders should 
be characterized by a greater efficiency than companies acting to maximize management 
utility. In the case of the company management not being shareholder-oriented and in-
stead focused on its own utility this fact should be reflected in decision-making and strat-
egy resulting in suboptimal company performance and value. Bethel and Liebeskind 
(1993) found support for the conclusion of Hill and Snell that “ownership concentration 
is associated with more efficient strategies and higher firm performance”. Hill and Snell 
(1989) further elaborate that in the case of concentrated ownership, information asymme-
tries are low while the ability of stockholders to remove a management team is high re-
sulting in the company management being likely to feel constrained to put into action 
strategies that are in the owners’ interests. Large positions in companies by institutional 
funds might be hard to get out of, where changing the management might provide an 
alternative for a dissatisfied owner (Graves & Waddock, 1990). 
“Ownership represents a source of power that can be used either to support or oppose 
management, depending on how it is concentrated and used. In general, the more con-
centrated ownership is the more potent potential support or opposition.” (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1980) 
The hypothesis of Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) that concentrated ownership could 
counteract company diversification and actually increase shareholder value has some sup-
port from Amihud & Lev (1981) who found that companies which have controlling, large 
block shareholders are less likely to engage in unrelated (value-reducing) mergers and 
acquisitions. This type of M&A activity can be related to diversification and empire-
building. Findings by Gaspar et al. (2005) show that weak monitoring by short-term 
shareholders may allow managers to proceed in value-reducing acquisitions or to bargain 
for personal benefits (job security, empire building) at the cost of the shareholders. They 
also show that long-term shareholders have larger incentives to monitor management re-
sulting in a lower probability of managers to trade off shareholder returns for their own 
personal benefits.  
Hill and Snell (1989) theorized that the owners seek to maximize their return on invest-
ment and in doing so, it is most efficient to maximize the efficiency of the company and 
oppose strategies that are perceived to have a detrimental effect on efficiency. Erenburg 
et al. (2016) suggested that large blockholders might encourage economic efficiency as 
they found institutional blockholdings to be positively correlated with the probability of 
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underperformers being acquired and to be negatively correlated with the probability of 
overperformers being acquired. Contrary to the former efficiency statement, Erenburg et 
al. (2016) also found that institutional blockholdings are positively correlated with sub-
sequent failure of underperformers. Large block shareholder ownership has been found 
(Hoskisson et al. 1994) to be negatively related to product diversification. Denis et al. 
(1997) found that agency problems are, in fact, responsible for companies maintaining 
value-reducing diversification strategies. Amihud and Lev (1999) presented evidence that 
companies with a greater concentration of ownership tend to be less diversified. Ho-
skisson et al. (2002) found that public pension funds had a tendency to prefer internal 
innovation where professional investment funds’ managers tended to prefer external in-
novation by acquisitions. They had a similar finding in terms of boards of directors where 
insiders with equity preferred internal innovation while outsiders with equity preferred 
external innovation. 
Research by Denis et al. (1997) found multiple sources of evidence for agency costs and 
two of their principal findings were that “there is a strong relation between the extent of 
diversification and managerial equity ownership” and “there is a weak negative relation 
between the value loss from diversification and managerial ownership”. The research of 
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) found no relation between insider ownership and company 
value.   
Amihud and Lev (1999) concluded that the involvement of institutional investors and the 
composition of the board of directors reduce agency costs related to the separation of 
control and ownership. Useem (1996)  has suggested that the managerial opportunism 
predicted by agency theory has been reduced by ownership activism. David, Hitt and 
Gimeno (2001) studied the role of institutional investors in influencing company R&D 
and concluded that pension funds perform more ownership activism activities than pro-
fessional investment funds and this activism is related to an increased level of R&D in-
vestments. Hill and Snell (1989) found evidence that in companies with diffuse ownership 
the management engaged in more unrelated diversification efforts and spent less on re-
search and development opposed to the case when the stockholdings were not diffuse. 
Their research findings included a positive relationship between stock concentration and 
productivity, measured in value added per employee. A negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D investments has been found by Graves (1988). This 
contrast with longitudinal research that has found support for a positive relationship be-
tween institutional ownership and company investments in internal innovation 
(Baysingewr, Kosnik & Turk 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Kochhar & David, 1996). 
According to Lemmon and Lins (2003) managers who are stockholders have a greater 
incentive to invest resources within the company into positive NPV projects as they have 
the opportunity to participate in greater future cash flows of the company in proportion 
to their ownership stake in the company. They conclude that ownership structure is an 
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important factor in determining the incentives for the insiders to expropriate minority 
shareholders in times of declining investment opportunities.   
The trend towards increased corporate focus, or focus on core competence(s), that con-
tinues to this day evident in many companies’ managements’ statements, was attributed 
to market disciplinary forces in Denis et al. (1997) research. These market disciplinary 
forces were described as acquisition attempts, financial distress, management turnover 
and share block purchases. Hill and Snell (1989) concluded that top managements have a 
tendency to prefer strategies that increase company size and reduce risk at the expense of 
efficiency as this enables them to maximize utility in terms of remuneration, power, se-
curity and status as the main characteristics of management utility. Amihud and Lev 
(1999) concluded that in general that increased corporate focus tends to be value-increas-
ing while diversification tends to result in value loss. Research by Gaspar et al. (2005) 
(will be described in more detail in Chapter 3.1) showed that investors’ investment hori-
zon has implications for management actions especially in M&A related costs and deci-
sion-making. Different investor groups investment horizons and the related characteris-
tics will be further discussed in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2.  
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3. INVESTOR TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS IN 
LITERATURE 
This chapter introduces different types of investors acting in the marketplace and the 
characteristics associated with the different types. Study of the area’s literature will pro-
vide a breakdown into two major sets of investors, institutional and household investors. 
The former will be the focus of Chapter 3.1 while the latter will be the focus of Chapter 
3.2. These two categories might as well be described as the professional and non-profes-
sional investors.  
First the investor types will be introduced with their varying characteristics and subcate-
gories. Next a thorough literature review will show definitive differences between the two 
types. The different incentives of the investor types will result in differences in behavior 
in the marketplace. Most of the literature will be based on research done in the United 
States. Special characteristics of the Finnish market and the investors in it will also be 
presented. 
Institutional investors play a large role in the stock market as they control enormous 
amounts of investment assets and therefore may exert control to a large extent over com-
panies’ management. Edwards and Hubbard (2000) reported that institutional investors 
controlled over 56 % of outstanding shares in all US exchanges, therefore making own-
ership’s preferences very relevant via increased shareholder activism (Hoskisson et al., 
2002). An and Zhang (2013) reported that institutional investors owned 78.5 percent of 
all common equity in the US market as of 2007. Household investors are less unified as 
a group in terms of proxy voting due to the smaller amount of shares owned by each 
investors compared to institutional investors while they still do exert control with respect 
to their shareholdings. This is especially true in countries like Finland where the majority 
of public companies respect the one-share one-vote rule. 
Household finance research is inspiring due to the fact that improved decision-making by 
households might prove to be a way to greater welfare in both developed and developing 
economies. John Maynard Keynes (1934) had the foresight to propose that in the future 
economists might be “thought as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists.” 
Dentists in developed economies spend a great amount of their working hours giving 
advice to patients in order to improve their oral hygiene –financial planners and private 
bankers should aspire to improve their clients’ financial literacy and decision-making 
while economists should be able to design advice and innovations to improve households’ 
financial hygiene. 
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“There is one important caveat to the notion that we live in a new economy, and that is 
human psychology… which appears to be essentially immutable.” Alan Greenspan, for-
mer chair of the US Federal Reserve, September 4th 1998 
Kaustia, Alho & Puttonen (2008) researched the anchoring effect, introduced to science 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), in university students and financial market profes-
sionals and they found a very large anchoring effect in the university students long-term 
stock market return expectations. A similar, statistically significant, however smaller, ef-
fect was found on the professionals even when controlling for experience. Professionals 
in the study were not conscious about the impact the past returns had on their expectations 
of future returns. The study concluded that expertise does indeed significantly attenuate 
behavioral biases although there are limits to debiasing. (Kaustia et al. 2008)  
“The willingness to bet on an uncertain event depends not only on the estimated likeli-
hood of that event and the precision of that estimate; it also depends on one’s general 
knowledge or understanding of the relevant context.” Competence hypothesis by Heath 
and Tversky, 1991. 
Heath and Tversky (1991) stated in their paper the following: “People prefer to bet in a 
context where they consider themselves knowledgeable or competent than in a context 
where they feel ignorant or uniformed,” providing additional light on their competence 
hypothesis stated above this paragraph.  They concluded the same paper with the follow-
ing remarks: “ Competence hypothesis might also help explain why investors are some-
times willing to forego the advantage of diversification and concentrate on a small num-
ber of companies with which they are presumably familiar.” (Heath & Tversky, 1991) 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) found that both investor trading experience and sophistication 
help with removing behavioral biases related to the disposition effect as follows:  
 The reference price plays an economically and statistically significant role in sell 
versus hold decisions in equities 
 Sophistication and trading experience eliminate the reluctance to realize losses  
 Men are 30 percent more likely to realize losses than women 
 Investors age 25-35 are 20 percent more likely to realize losses than investors over 
the age of 55 
 Sophistication and trading experience reduce the propensity to realize gains by 37 
percent (however they fail to eliminate this bias) 
 As investor wealth increases, behavior consistent with traditional finance theory 
diminishes  
 The more equity wealth an individual has, the less risk averse the individual tends 
to be and the tendency to realize losses increases 
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Grinblatt and Keloharju’s (2001) research in Finland supports the findings of Feng and 
Seasholes  in terms of reference price playing a significant role in hold versus sell deci-
sions. Feng & Seasholes used Grinblatt and Keloharju’s research methods while extend-
ing them to a data set of Chinese individual investors. Huberman (2001) researched 
American investors and found compelling evidence that familiarity breeds investment in 
both private and institutional investors as by and large the investors’ money stays within 
the country they inhabit. This can be seen in investment and saving rates in different 
countries, where they match each other rather closely (Feldstein & Horikoka, 1980). Hu-
berman (2001) explained that the home country bias is a simple preference by people to 
invest in the familiar, ‘root for the home team’ and feel comfortable in purchasing equity 
in businesses that are visible to them. Another reason for such investment behavior could 
be reduced monitoring and search costs associated with nearby companies or exploitation 
of private information through relationships with company executives (Coval & Mos-
kowitz, 2001).  
The tendency, to invest in one’s home country, is in stark contrast to portfolio theory and 
leads to non-optimal diversification and sub-optimal levels of investment in stocks 
abroad. Baik et al. (2010) found that the level and the change of local institutional own-
ership predict future returns of a company, evidence that local investors indeed do have 
an advantage over non-local investors. Giofre (2013) studied individual and institutional 
investors in France, Italy, Spain and Sweden and found evidence that households’ port-
folio investments are influenced more by proximity variables than those of institutional 
investors, other affecting variables being the transparency of the destination stock market 
and the presence of Euronext, a common stock exchange market. Coval & Moskowitz 
(1999) found supporting evidence for Huberman’s home country bias while extending it 
to locality within the US and they suggested that information asymmetries might be one 
of the drivers of observed preference for geographically proximate companies. In their 
another paper Coval & Moskowitz (2001) found that equity ownership level of nearby 
investors is positively correlated with the equity’s future returns, supporting their earlier 
claim of information asymmetries via abnormal returns earned by local professional in-
vestors. They wondered whether it would actually be optimal for mutual funds to be have 
even more focus in their portfolios on their local companies as these investments have a 
tendency to provide abnormal returns. Heath and Tversky’s (1991) competence hypothe-
sis does support Coval and Moskowitz’s findings and could be considered a necessary 
assumption if one is to to conclude that mutual fund managers, or professional asset man-
agers in general, provide a service of value to the ultimate investors. Baik et al. (2010) 
concluded by suggesting that local institutional investors and investment advisers have 
informational advantages over non-local investors and the exploitation of the former re-
sults in excess returns.  
French and Poterba (1991) have estimated that US, Japanese, UK investors hold 93, 98 
and 82 percent of their portfolios, respectively, in their home equity markets and they 
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argue that these statistics are not consistent with standard models of asset allocation. Hu-
berman (2001) states that a favourable view of equities that the investors has an affinity 
tends to increase wishful thinking, whether the investor has a stake in the companies or 
not. He continues that it seems like people tend to look favourably upon equities the in-
vestors are familiar with and have a belief that these familiar equities are more likely to 
deliver higher returns while exhibiting lower equity-specific risks. Huberman (2001) con-
cludes that the former tilts investors’ portfolios toward familiar stocks and investors thus 
fail to optimize along objective risk-return trade-offs.  
Barber and Ocean (1999) have identified two common mistakes made by investors, ex-
cessive trading and a tendency to hold on to losers while selling winners and they asserted 
that these are a result of systematic irrationality of investors, being proponents of behav-
ioral finance. According to them, overconfidence biases investors into trading too often 
and the human desire to avoid regret prompts investors into keeping past losers while 
selling past winners. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) reported that the tendency to holding 
past losers is increased for all investors types in cases where the losses exceed 30 % of 
the value of the investment.  Behaviors described by Barber and Ocean (1999) may result 
in market inefficiencies as investors refraining from selling losers might slow down the 
speed at which negative news are translated into equity prices and on the other hand the 
tendency to buy equities with recent extreme performance cause recent winners’ equity 
prices to balloon beyond their true value. They do offer a condition that in order for these 
biases to have an effect on asset prices, they must be systematic and investors must be 
willing to act on them.  
In their article Barber and Ocean (1999) predict that bull markets, characterized by in-
creasing equity values, would increase trading volumes due to the two tendencies outlined 
in the former paragraph. Positive returns fuel the investors’ overconfidence leading to 
ever increasing volumes of trading during bull markets where most investors are success-
ful in generating returns without any regard to the investors’ sophistication, expertise, 
insight or lack of these. Heath and Tversky (1999) proposed that competence or expertise 
helps individuals in taking credit when they are successful and sometimes helps them by 
providing protection against blame when they fail. Statman et al. (2004) found supporting 
evidence for the prediction as their research indicated that current market returns predict 
subsequent trading volume over even short horizons, such as a month, which is definitely 
a shorter time frame than is required in order for investors and analysts to call the market 
a bull market. They attributed this finding to investors’ overconfidence and the effect was 
stronger in small-cap stocks where individuals’ ownership were large.  
Liu et al. (2016) found that both individual and institutional investors express more over-
confidence in trading behavior during high market return regimes than low market return 
regimes and the during the former, individual investors trade with more overconfidence 
than institutional investors. Their findings support behavioral finance theory in that higher 
overconfident trading leads to higher return volatilities. Thorley and Vorkink (2004) the 
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economic significance of high market returns may be substantial for market-makers such 
as brokers and specialists, whose economic logic is based on commissions, – for an ex-
ample a high monthly return of 7 % might result in a full ‘extra month’ in trading volumes 
over the next 6 month period compared to a -5 % monthly return.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) asserted that contrarian behavior in investing is exhibited 
the most by the following investor groups: households, government and non-profit insti-
tutions. Domestic companies, including financial and insurance companies, tend to ex-
hibit less contrarian behavior when assessing recent stock price run-ups and are on aver-
age more sophisticated than the three abovementioned investor groups. Lastly they argue 
that foreign investors are the most sophisticated and tend to exhibit the most momentum 
strategies with respect to past returns. In practice and in their data these strategies showed 
up as tendencies of foreigners buying stocks at their monthly highs while domestic inves-
tors had an inclination to sell at monthly highs and buy at monthly lows.  
Odean (1998) studied household investors (10 000 accounts at a large discount brokerage) 
in the US and found that investors have a tendency to sell past winners instead of past 
losers and in doing so effectively engage in contrarian strategies. Dhar and Kumar (2001) 
studied investors in the US marketplace as well, finding evidence for both momentum 
and contrarian strategies being apparent in their data. They found strong evidence for 
contrarian strategies that were guided by the stocks’ monthly lows and highs. Grinblatt et 
al. (1995) found evidence that institutional investors, in their study being focused on mu-
tual funds, exhibit momentum strategies and have a tendency for herding, buying or sell-
ing the same stocks at the same time. They found that the 77 percent of mutual funds that 
exhibited momentum strategies tended to outperform the other funds and the momentum 
trading was most evident in buying behavior, which in practice meant buying past win-
ners.  
3.1 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors are the major players in the financial markets and the majority of 
trading volume is attributed to them while household investors constitute a small fraction 
of the trading volume (Basak & Pavlova, 2013). Fernando et al. (2014) found evidence 
that institutional investors tend to avoid investing in family-controlled firms. Ruiz (2018) 
conducted research over institutional investors’ effect on economic growth in industrial-
ized nations finding that institutional investors have a positive effect on economic growth 
via GDP per capita measure. Therefore he suggests that industrialized nations should en-
act friendly policies to institutional investors, providing good incentives and regulations 
in order to attract institutional investors to the respective nation as this should result in 
higher economic growth.  
Davis and Steil (2001) broke down institutional investors as a group into three subgroups; 
insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds. Insurance companies invest their 
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customers prepaid premiums, also known as float, while pension funds invest workers’ 
money in order to finance their future retirement. Mutual funds invest other institutions’ 
and households’ capital in order to gain a fair return, essentially providing investing as a 
service.  
Davis and Steil (2001) described a major difference between banks and institutional in-
vestors by concluding that banks tend to rely on private information in their investment 
and/or lending decision-making while institutional investors rely on public information. 
Institutions and households may realize a positive externality arising from bank monitor-
ing according to Ang et al. (2001) as bank monitoring tends to increase efficiency and 
thus, lower agency costs. Institutional investors have many advantages over household 
investors due to economies of scale – lower commission rates on trades and smaller cost 
for investment advisory/management fees. Other advantages due to large size may be 
higher level of control over the company, possibly in the form of seat(s) in the companies’ 
boards of directors, more votes on companies’ propositions and better access to manage-
ment.   (Davis & Steil, 2001.) 
Keloharju et al. (2012) study’s results suggest that institutional investors invest more in 
money market funds, bond funds and other funds than individual investors while invest-
ing much less in balanced funds. Their research also compared institutional investors’ 
portfolios with other groups finding them to be the most similar with portfolios of wealthy 
individuals and those with a graduate or business degree. Basak and Pavlova (2013) found 
that institutions have a tendency to tilt their portfolios towards stocks that are in their 
benchmark index, the index that their returns are compared to, also called ‘closet-index-
ing’. Their finding has implications for the indices used as benchmarks and they found 
that this behavior indeed boosts index stocks’ prices and results in excess correlation be-
tween the stocks that are included in the respective index. Barber and Ocean (2000) con-
cluded in their study that institutional investors have a clear preference for large stock. In 
a more recent study Barber and Ocean (2008) found that the buying behavior of profes-
sionals is least influenced by attention. They further argued in their research that profes-
sionals buying and selling behavior are much more alike each other than those of individ-
ual investors due to the fact that a large part of the professionals take both long and short 
positions contrary to individual investors and also in search of stocks to sell professionals’ 
portfolios tend to have a larger set of different equities in effect giving more sell oppor-
tunities even if they do not engage in short-selling.  
Rantapuska and Knüpfer (2008) researched the Finnish market and different market par-
ticipants’ action in the marketplace. Their study concentrated on rights’ issues and which 
investors left money on the table during the respective events. They found that financial 
institutions, with large portfolio and high rates of trading activity, take advantage of the 
less savvy investors during rights’ issues by purchasing subscription rights at depressed 
price levels. Siikanen et al. (2016) found that Facebook activity has no effect on institu-
tional investors’ investment decisions, contrary to those of individual retail investors. 
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Basak and Pavlova (2013) suggested that the presence of institutions as owners of equity 
might generate momentum of stock returns. Momentum strategies, exercised by institu-
tions especially, are further explained in the following paragraph. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) studied the investment behavior and performance of dif-
ferent investor types in the Finnish market with significant results as follows: Foreign 
investors are the most sophisticated investor group in the Finnish market and they tend to 
pursue momentum-strategies, buying past winners and selling past losers (winners and 
losers determined by the past 6 month returns) while Finnish investors, especially house-
holds, exhibit contrarian investment styles buying past losers and selling past winners. In 
another paper, studying what makes investors trade Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) found 
that an investor’s strategy, whether contrarian or momentum-based is exacerbated by the 
stock price being at either a monthly high or a monthly low. They found that the degree 
of contrarianism was inversely related to the degree of sophistication of the investor and 
6-month returns were positively related with investor sophistication. As a result, foreign 
investors had the best performance over 6-month periods, households the worst with do-
mestic institutions in the middle. (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000.) 
El-Gazzar (1998) has found a negative association between the level of institutional hold-
ings in a company and the company stock’s volatility while Potter (1992) documented 
the contrary, finding a positive association between the two variables. According to 
Bushee and Noe (2000) different types of institutional investors have different effects on 
equity volatility – transient institutions with short-term investment horizons increasing 
volatility while quasi-indexers with long-term investment horizons decreasing volatility. 
Basak and Pavlova (2013) found that institutions amplify the volatility of stocks repre-
sented in their benchmark index as well as aggregate stock market volatility. Gabaix et 
al. (2006) presented a theory that very large institutions cause excess volatility due to the 
size of their trades, generating significant spikes in volume and returns despite the lack 
of news regarding the equities’ fundamentals.  
Sias (1996) studied institutional investors, institutional ownership and volatility and 
found evidence that an increase in institutional holdings in a company induces an increase 
in the volatility of the stock, which is inconsistent with most academic theories predic-
tions. One of his hypotheses was that securities that have higher volatilities attract insti-
tutional investors, which his study proved to be a false hypothesis. Institutional investors 
tend to trade in higher volumes than individual investors and tend to exploit more program 
trading, both of which Sias suggests as potential reasons for the increase in volatility in-
duced by an increase in institutional ownership. His research supports the findings that 
larger capitalization companies tend to have larger relative ownership by institutions. 
(Sias, 1996.)  
Graves and Waddock (1990) found that increasing levels of institutional ownership com-
monly correlate with higher turnover rates in the market and shorter holding time periods. 
25 
From 1965 to 1985 the annual turnover rate went from 16 to 54 percent while the market 
changed from being dominated by individual investors into being dominated by institu-
tional investors. Poterba et al. (1995) studied stock ownership patterns with data from 
1962, -83 and -92 and found that there is a significant trend towards an increase in indirect 
stock ownership via mutual funds, thrift plans and pension funds.  
Hoskisson et al. (2002) state that pension fund managers differ from other investment 
professionals in that they do not feel pressure for immediate returns as a result of different 
characteristics of 1) their ultimate investors’ (=pensioners) long time horizons and 2) 
compensation. Due to pension funds’ broad and diversified portfolios, in many jurisdic-
tions mandated by law, the funds often prefer indexing over regular entries and exits into 
different investment products so their portfolios tend to have small turnover rates accord-
ing to Gilson and Kraakman (1991).  
Gaspar et al. (2005) outline that institutional investors have different portfolio time hori-
zons for multiple reasons including different demographics of liquidity needs of the final 
owners. They argue that frequent capital inflows and outflows of some institutional in-
vestors such as open-ended mutual funds result in short-term investment horizons in con-
trast to the long-term investment horizons of employee pension funds. The predictability 
of capital inflows and outflows or lack of it has serious implications for fund managers. 
Another example of such difference in institutional investors’ differences in investment 
time horizons was presented in Chapter 2.3 where Hoskisson et al. (2002) research found 
that professional investment funds preferred external innovation via acquisitions and pen-
sion funds preferring internal innovation, the former representing short-term focus while 
the latter representing long-term focus in terms of investing time horizons. Pension funds’ 
dynamics provide a short-term incentive for the fund managers in the defined benefit 
system as follows: Employer contributions vary so when the fund manager does well in 
the market (growing the assets of the fund) the contribution by the employer decreases 
(Graves & Waddock, 1990). The study by Hoskisson et al. (2002) explained differences 
in investor groups’ preferences of innovation type by variance in the investors’ time ho-
rizons and incentive systems in place.   
According to Gaspar et al. (2005) the institutional investors’ investment horizon has mul-
tiple effects on companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions: Short-term investors in 
the target company increase the probability of a takeover and lower its cost while in the 
bidder the same investor group gives managers more leeway to engage in value-reducing 
acquisitions. Their research shows also that long-term investors defend managements 
from takeovers by making takeover bids more expensive and also prevent the manage-
ment from overbidding and value-reducing acquisitions.   
Gompers and Metrick (2001) found that large institutions, institutions with at least $100 
million under management, almost doubled their share of the common stock market own-
ership in New York Stock Exchange from 1980 to 1996 and the largest 100 institutions’ 
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ownership in the stock market increased from 19.0 to 37.1 percent over the same time 
period. They found that these institutions typically invest in different stocks than others 
– they prefer larger companies with more liquidity and relatively low returns over the past 
year and these preferences were stable over time. According to Gompers and Metrick this 
has resulted in the disappearance of the small-cap premium – from 1927 to 1979 small-
cap stocks earned about a 4 percent premium annually over large-cap stocks and this trend 
has reversed after 1980 due to the above findings, increased demand for large-cap stocks 
resulting in higher prices and higher returns annually. (Gompers & Metrick, 2001.) 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found through their research that investment managers in 
the US have a strong preference for locally headquartered companies in their domestic 
portfolios, exhibiting a similar trait to home country bias while extending to the local 
companies within the country and/or state as the companies are more familiar to the man-
agers.  In another study, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) found abnormal performance in 
locally held firms and they interpreted this as evidence that investors are more motivated 
to invest in nearby companies due to information advantages. These information ad-
vantages could perhaps be explained by more exposure to the companies’ stakeholders 
including but not limited to employees, clients and suppliers.  
Puttonen & Torstila (2003) researched risk management in Finnish pension funds, by 
surveys directed to pension funds, finding that the most used risk measurement being used 
is volatility, or beta in financial terms. They found that the majority of funds do not re-
quire risk-adjusted return reports from external fund managers and monthly portfolio per-
formance is followed by most funds. Their survey found that fund managers are particu-
larly concerned over equity price risks.  
The fact that fund managers follow monthly portfolio performance might lead into short-
term focus by the funds resulting in sub-optimal returns. Pension funds in Finland could 
gain better results by focusing more on long-term results by following longer term per-
formance, for an example 5 or 10 year performances of the portfolios compared to the 
most used performance metric of monthly performance. The prevalence of short-term 
thinking can lead to suboptimal decision-making by fund managers, who have an incen-
tive to protect their assets under management by focusing more on the short-term results 
of their investment portfolios. Beta as an indicator of risk might also given critique espe-
cially in the case of pension funds’ risk management as their investment time horizon is 
by necessity decades, not months or years and therefore they could withstand way greater 
volatility than private fund managers if the volatility comes with greater expected returns. 
If one investor has the capability to withstand enormous volatility, that is the pension fund 
managers. 
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3.2 Household investors 
Shum and Faig (2006) researched household finance utilizing a rich data set synthesized 
out of US consumer finance surveys through 1992-2001 time period, while exploring how 
to explain household stockholdings in public companies. They had important findings 
which are summarized below: 
i. Stock ownership correlates positively with multiple factors including having 
sought financial advice, wealth, age and retirement savings, 
ii. Stock ownership is negatively correlated with the willingness to perform non-
fnancial investments in the future (own home or own business) and holdings of 
other risky assets, namely investments in private businesses, 
iii. Factors increasing the likelihood of stock ownership were saving for 1) household 
purchases, 2) retirement and 3) education bills, contrary to saving for private busi-
ness enterprise, which decreased the likelihood of stock ownership, 
iv. Households in 2001 were more likely to to hold stocks than before as well as those 
who held stock were more likely to have a larger share of equities in their portfo-
lios compared to earlier and 
v. The two most popular equity allocations in retirement accounts and mutual funds 
are zero and 100 percent followed by approximately 50 percent 
Campbell’s (2006) findings support Shum and Faig’s paper as according to his paper, 
education, income and wealth levels have strong positive effects on public equity partic-
ipation. Barber and Ocean (2000) studied individual households’ stock investments’ per-
formance via discount brokerage trading records and had multiple major findings:  
i. An average household turns over 75 percent of its common stock portfolio every 
year – therefore households trade frequently, 
ii. Households have a tendency for investing in small, high volatility (beta) stocks 
and there is a smaller tendency, yet it exists, for preferring value (high book value 
compared to market value) stocks and 
iii. Trading costs are high, the average buy-and-sell trade of over $ 1,000 in nominal 
value costs three percent in commissions and one percent in bid-ask spread. 
Barrot et al. (2016) performed a study on a 9-year time frame (2002-2010) of French 
investors in the European marketplace looking at individual investors trading behavior 
and performance while focusing on individual investors as a source of liquidity especially 
during a crisis. They found that individual investors provide liquidity to the stock market 
especially in the case institutional liquidity drying up, or the lack of such liquidity. In the 
paper they show that individual investors tend to earn great excess returns (40% annual-
ized returns) over weeks, where the VIX was above the sample median (median value of 
20 during the time frame) and exhibit higher risk-bearing capacity during crisis contrary 
to institutional investors. Their data showed that household investors in aggregate have a 
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contrarian investing strategy. In their data sample individual investors had an average 
holding period of over three hundred days, the excess returns are present for approxi-
mately 20 days (Kaniel et al. 2008), and for that reason the individual investors failed to 
gain the benefits from providing liquidity – also failing to earn excessive returns over the 
long-term due to trading too little contrary to the findings of Barber and Ocean (2000) of 
investors trading too frequently.  
Kaniel et al. (2008) found supporting evidence for Barrot et al. (2016) claims of individual 
investors providing liquidity in order to meet the demand for immediate liquidity by in-
stitutional investors in NYSE stocks. Kaniel et al. (2008) paper found evidence that indi-
vidual investors tend to buy stocks following declines in the previous month and sell 
following price increases, therefore exhibiting contrarian investment strategy character-
istics. Their study findings included positive excess returns in the month following in-
tense buying by individuals and, respectively, negative excess returns in the month fol-
lowing intense selling by individuals. In another paper Kaniel et al. (2012) found that 
individual investors in NYSE stocks trade using a contrarian strategy related to both, re-
turns and news after earnings announcements. Also, they found that on and after earnings 
announcements dates individual investors intense buying behavior (selling) predicts large 
positive (negative) abnormal returns, half of which can be attributed to private infor-
mation. In their paper Kaniel et al. (2012) suggested that individual investors may exploit 
private information (insider information) to a greater extent than institutional investors 
due to the great difference in size of the investor groups, their holdings and trades as well 
as the fact that individual investors are less constrained with respect to diversification 
requirements and short-selling.  The smaller size of individual investors’ stock positions 
reduces the risk of investigation into insider trading, which might encourage such  
behavior. 
When studying individual and institutional investors behavior in the marketplace and the 
effect that attention and the news have on this behavior Barber and Ocean (2008) found 
that rational investors will more likely sell their past losers, in effect postponing capital 
gains taxes and behaviorally motivated investors are more likely to sell their past winners, 
in effect postponing the psychological feeling of regret associated with realizing a loss. 
This avoidance of selling losers (and selling winners too soon) in order to avoid regret 
was labeled the disposition effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985), extending Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, which Kahneman and Tversky were awarded a 
Nobel prize for.  Barber  and Ocean’s (2008) research pointed that individual investors 
might focus more on the future returns of the stocks they purchase while putting more 
focus on past returns of the stocks they decide to liquidate, or sell. One tendency found 
to be true for individual investors in the data was that they are net-buyers on high-atten-
tion days and for stocks with very poor prior day performance (lowest 5%) the purchases 
outnumber sales by almost a multiple of two. (Barber & Ocean, 2008.) 
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Strong evidence has been found that investors have a preference for domestic equities 
(Heath & Tversky, 1991, French & Poterba, 1991, Feldstein & Horikoka, 1980 and Hu-
berman, 2001). This conflicts with portfolio theory’s advice to diversify (Huberman 
2001) and may result in suboptimal results and higher risk portfolios. Huberman (2001) 
further extends that this behavior is consistent with home country bias and may be espe-
cially hazardous for individuals who invest a large proportion of their retirement savings 
in their employer’s equity.  
“The investor’s chief problem – and even his worst enemy – is likely to be himself”  
–Benjamin Graham, author of Security Analysis & the Intelligent Investor 
Barber and Ocean’s (2000) research found that in gross terms households in aggregate 
outperformed the common US indices, however the net result lags the indices due to the 
high trading costs. Lastly, their results showed that households with high turnover rates 
underperformed households with low turnover rates of their portfolios. Campbell (2006) 
found that poorer and less educated households are more likely than better educated and 
wealthier households to commit investment mistakes. According to a later study by Bar-
ber and Ocean (2008) individual investors are more likely to buy attention-grabbing 
stocks than to sell them and when doing so, the authors offer an explanation that attention 
affects buying more than selling due to the fact that individual investors have a large 
universe to choose from while when making sell decisions they may only sell stocks that 
they own, assuming there is not short selling by the individual investors. The purchases 
that are based on attention, according to Barber and Ocean, could temporarily inflate a 
stock’s price, which might over time lead to disappointing returns going forward. Their 
research concluded that the individual investors’ preferences come into play only after 
attention has narrowed down the the choice set, stating that “when alternatives are many 
and search costs high, attention may affect choice more profoundly than preferences 
do”.Even though individuals in todays market have similar access to information about 
stocks via computer searches and stock screening tools as institutional investors, individ-
ual investors on average are less likely to use such tools therefore giving attention a larger 
emphasis in their behavior in the market. (Barber and Ocean, 2008.) 
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Siikanen et al. (2016) found that Finnish household investors, especially passive and less 
sophisticated ones, may be biased by Facebook activity in investment decisions related 
to Nokia stock. They stated that as Facebook is not a regulated source of company infor-
mation and therefore can be a source of biased information, which could result in subop-
timal decision-making especially in the case of less sophisticated investors. Keloharju et 
al. (2012) have found that older investors are significantly more likely to invest in stocks 
than younger individuals. Keloharju et al. researched  Finnish ownership of stocks and 
mutual funds for the time period from 2004 to 2008. Other tendencies that they’ve found 
in the Finnish market have been that:  
i. Finnish speakers (1st language) have smaller portfolios than non-Finnish speakers, 
ii. women tend to invest in less risky funds than men, 
iii. 13 % of Finnish individuals own stocks and 16% mutual funds and 5% own both 
as of 2008, median stock portfolio being worth ~3,700 € and fund portfolio ~2,600 
€, 
iv. ownership of mutual funds is less concentrated than ownership of stocks and 
v. the richest 1% of stockowners owned 49.3% of individuals’ combined stock 
wealth and the richest 1% of fund owners owned 33.1% of individuals combined 
fund wealth. 
The amount of Finnish investors found in Keloharju et al. study (2012) owning stocks 
and/or mutual funds was ~125,000 individuals in 2008 out of the population of ~5.4 mil-
lion. The relatively small average sizes of the portfolios and number of individual inves-
tors compared to markets like the US result from the fact that the individuals’ pension 
funds consisting of various investments including stocks are not regarded to be owned by 
the individual under the Finnish law, but rather the pension fund, an institutional investor, 
contrary to the American or Singaporean systems, or thrift plans, of 401(k)s and CPFs. 
According to Keloharju et al. (2012) age has a significant effect on the portfolio compo-
sition of Finnish investors, the younger investors having a tendency to prefer indirect 
investments through mutual funds. Mutual funds were introduced in the Finnish market 
in 1987 and began to gain popularity in the 1990s according to Keloharju et al. (2012) 
which might explain why younger investors tend to invest more in mutual funds than 
direct stocks while older investors might be reluctant to take advantage of the new finan-
cial innovation of mutual funds and/or used to the way of investing directly into stocks. 
Investment differences of French household investors in mutual funds and direct stock 
investments during crisis were highlighted by Barrot et al. (2016) as during the financial 
crisis individual investors increased their purchases of common stocks while selling out 
of their mutual fund positions – effectively taking more risk during times of uncertainty.  
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Rantapuska and Knüpfer (2008) found that investors with small portfolios, inactive trad-
ing history and investors who know neither official language of Finland and investors 
living abroad tend to leave the most money on the table during rights issues. Shum and 
Faig (2006) had found that household investors in the US had an increased share of their 
financial portfolios in equities in 2001 (this survey was done between May and December 
2001) compared to the past decade, what makes this interesting is that the stock market 
had performed very poorly following the dot-com bubble, so actually individual house-
holds were bullish after the market crash acting as contrarians as a group. Campbell 
(2006) found evidence that some financial products involving a cross-subsidy from naïve 
household investors to sophisticated household investors and this may discourage wel-
fare-improving financial innovation. Less than 10 percent of the stock positions in Feng 
and Seasholes (2005) data set were held for a longer time period than 50 days, represent-
ing the investment horizon of Chinese individual investors. 
Polkovnichenko (2005) explains that one of the most persistent features in human deci-
sion-making is the variance in risk attitudes and this can not easily be dismissed as a 
motive for holding undiversified portfolios. His data does suggest that the idea of getting 
rich through a long shot appeals to household investors in a similar way that it appeals to 
lottery players, casino gamblers and subjects in experimental decision studies. Campbell 
(2006) researched households financial decision-making and found that certain house-
holds prefer to delegate financial decisions to professionals and in doing so may end up 
paying high fees to financial planners, mutual funds and banks.  Pålsson (1996) re-
searched the Swedish market’s household investors risk aversion and the results suggest 
that risk aversion in household investors correlates with age only.  Feng and Seasholes 
(2005) found that men and young investors are more likely to realize losses than women 
and older investors using a data set of Chinese individual investors. 
Halko Kaustila & Alanko (2011) studied the gender effect in risky asset holdings finding 
many differences between the sexes and they are presented here: First, women are more 
risk averse in general and this extends to women in finance and wealthy private banking 
customers. Next, women take less risk in the stock market. The strongest predictor for the 
proportion of wealth invested in stocks was found to be a self-reported financial risk atti-
tude. Lastly, gender effect in risky shares increases with age although the risk attitudes 
stay constant over the life cycle.  When controlling for risk attitude, financial knowledge, 
education, income and wealth the gender effect becomes negative.  (Halko, Kaustila & 
Alanko, 2011.) 
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4. RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Case selection  
In order to gain insight into companies with varying ownership bases, a wide range of 
Finnish companies was selected for the study. Few companies were excluded from the 
study due to them being acquired during and after the research time period, Lem-
minkäinen being acquired by YIT and Pohjola Pankki being taken private by Osuus-
pankki. As a result of the selection process a set of seven companies ended up in the final 
version of the study. These companies have had and continue to have very different own-
ership structures from each other:  
 A company with the Finnish government as the controlling shareholder  
 A company with a single family as the controlling shareholder 
 A company with non-profit associations as the controlling shareholders 
 Diffusely owned companies  
The case companies characteristics vary largely in market capitalization, shareholder 
amount, shareholder composition, revenues and net profits and geographic reach. These 
differences should present themselves in differing ownership structures. These differ-
ences were taken into account when choosing the case companies out of all the companies 
listed on Helsinki Stock Exchange as a variance in the companies’ characteristics was 
deemed desirable. The case companies are listed as follows: 
 Nokia  
 Kone  
 Sampo  
 UPM-Kymmene 
 Finnair 
 Stockmann 
 Saga Furs 
4.2 Description of the data used in the study 
The ownership data used in the study has been obtained from Euroclear for research pur-
poses by TUT. By aggregating all stock transactions completed within the time frame of 
the study, aggregated portfolios for each investor group were constructed. The time 
frames for each company had little variance with the maximum time frame being 20 years 
and the minimum 11 years. The portfolios were constructed for the end of each month or 
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12 times every year. The data was very extensive with multiple variables which will be 
described next: 
Investor type 
 Financial/Insurance (later referred to as institutional investors) 
 Non-Financial companies 
 Non-Profit 
 Rest-World 
 General Government 
 Households 
Investor gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other (institutions with no single decision-maker in charge of portfolio) 
 
Investor age 
 Birth decade 
Eventually the majority of all stocks, exceptions being governments and non-profits as 
shareholders, have an identifiable private owner  – public companies shareholdings’ could 
be attributed to the company’s shareholders in respect to their shareholdings. With this 
data set we are able to look at which entity is holding the stock and a view of the compa-
nies’ ownership bases can be established.  
The study was first performed while including nominee shareholdings and transactions, 
which was deemed inappropriate in terms of transparency. Therefore, a decision was 
made to exclude all nominee shareholdings and transactions from the data set. For many 
case companies, especially the large capitalization ones; Nokia, Kone, UPM-Kymmene 
and Sampo, this resulted in a major change in ownership structure as large, foreign inves-
tors have large shareholdings in these companies through nominee arrangements. This 
results in ownership structure charts that do not represent a 100 percent of the respective 
company’s total amount of shares outstanding and therefore they do not represent corpo-
rate control in terms of voting power.  
The  majority of all stock holdings fall under Male and Other groups as pension fund 
managers as well as household investors are more often male than female (Keloharju et 
al. 2012). The majority of institutional owners gender being listed as male could be due 
to the fact that the financial industry and investing have historically been male-dominant 
fields of work.  
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Investor age is listed in the data with no more specificity than the birth decade, so that all 
all male household holdings, where the owner has been born between 1950 and 1959 will 
be listed under Male, Households & 1950 categories. The majority of all individual and 
institutional holdings have investor ages listed in the data set. The monthly constructed 
portfolios might distort the specific data points for an example in the case where a de-
ceased person’s estate’s assets have been distributed. These changes that are impossible 
to interpret from the data resulted in the study not focusing on very specific and narrow 
groups and instead the focus was turned into major shareholder groups and changes in 
their shareholdings.  
Birth decade, as a variable, was left out of the data analysis due to multiple reasons, the 
most important being the fact that some investors’ identity could not be fully protected if 
such analysis was done. Gender as a variable was also left out of the data analysis as the 
data obtained was insufficient in quantity (available for less than 10 % of the sharehold-
ings in the majority of cases) in order to use it in the study. 
Regulators, such as SEC in the US or FIVA in Finland, enforce public companies to in-
form investors and the public about their business practices, financial information and 
major changes within the companies’ business and industry, for an example new regula-
tions and their effects on the business or M&A acitivities. One major source of infor-
mation for this study has been official company reports, which are mandatory to issue by 
FIVA in Finland. Multiple case companies have more than one share class and therefore 
the data analysis is performed specifically on a single share. This share class is pointed 
out for each company, where applicable.  
When looking at the analysis, one must consider that there are sources of error including 
events, where for an example, a certain owner reallocates his ownership in a form of a 
charitable gift from private (household) to a charitable organization (non-profit) or an-
other person, often the previous owner’s child or kin. All equity issues have been ac-
counted for in the data and equity issues often shake up the ownership base – hardly ever 
does the ownership base stay constant after an equity issue when raising capital. These 
events can result in large jumps and drops in shareholdings of an investor group as a 
percentage of the total shares outstanding. Good examples of this are explained in  Sampo 
(4.4.3), where both, a merger agreement and a reorganization of an owner’s shareholdings 
shook up the shareholder base in a substantial way. 
Given the extensive data set, long time frame and limitations of the data (described above) 
it was deemed appropriate to search for long-term trends in ownership base change. The 
data has been refined over the years since it was obtained by TUT and is of high quality 
for the time frames and companies. After deliberation a decision was made to utilize 
monthly changes in ownership and closing prices at the end of the months.   
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Price data for the selected companies has been obtained from Nasdaq Nordic. Due to 
various issues given the long time frame of the ownership data, share price data for all 
companies was not obtained for the whole time frame. For an example Kone’s initial 
public offering was in 2005 and therefore ownership and price data is only available for 
less than 15 years. The maximum time frame available was used for all case companies.  
4.3 Methods 
The data analysis begins in Chapter 5.1 with an analysis of ownership structures of the 
case companies during the time period of 22 years (1995-2016) for the majority of case 
companies and shorter time periods in the case of Kone (6/2005-2016), Sampo (1997-
2016) and UPM-Kymmene (4/1996-2016). Here, all shareholdings of the stock in ques-
tion were listed under investor groups and a snapshot of the ownership structure for the 
last day of each observed month was taken. This data was presented with charts and sta-
tistics tables for each company. Another look at the data was presented through charting 
the adjusted stocks prices with the nominal value of ownership stakes of the investor 
groups. Here, one must notice that all nominee shareholdings are excluded from Chapter 
5 and therefore the charts and tables do not represent the total amount of shares outstand-
ing of the case companies. Historical price data obtained from NASDAQ Helsinki was 
used in this analysis while combining it with the ownership data obtained from Euroclear. 
There were many options in how to deal with the statistics of ownership and the changes 
within them and through various iterations the final decision was to observe, how investor 
groups acted during annual highs and lows of the stock price in Chapter 5.2 (later referred 
to as the High/Low analysis). A second, similar, analysis was performed for each month 
during the time frame comparing buy/sell decisions by investor groups and comparing 
them with monthly returns (later referred to as the Monthly analysis). This was done to 
assess whether investor groups had systematic tendencies in their investment decision-
making as well as differences in these tendencies across the groups. Important to note 
here is that, especially in the cases Nokia, Kone, Sampo and UPM-Kymmene, changes 
through nominee transactions and changes in nominee shareholdings are not accounted 
for and therefore the monthly snapshots of ownership do not represent the ownership of 
all shares outstanding. Many academic studies have found institutional owners with a 
preference for momentum strategies and household owners having a preference for con-
trarian strategies in the marketplace (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001, Shum & Faig, 2006, 
Wermers, 1997).  
Of major interest was, do investor groups have tendencies such as exploiting momentum- 
or contrarian-based strategies. Therefore calendar year highs and lows for the stock price 
adjusted for splits were deemed of major interest and they were observed for each com-
pany (High/Low analysis) for the whole time period available – 1997-2016 for the ma-
jority of the cases. All equity issues and buybacks of sizeable impact to the shareholder 
composition were taken into account during the study. Next, changes in ownership of all 
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investor groups were calculated for each of the aforementioned months. The same proce-
dure was done in the Monthly analysis section for each month in the time period while 
comparing the buys and sells of investor groups with the same month’s stock returns. 
The data was analysed so that for every annual high and low point for the stock price, the 
geometric change of investor group holdings was calculated. Same procedure was done 
for each month to look at general trends over the time frame. Contrarian strategy during 
the time period was described as buying at annual lows and selling at annual highs. Mo-
mentum strategy was described as selling at annual lows and buying at annual highs. For 
the Monthly analysis, the stock’s return was used for determining strategy type – buying 
(selling) during a positive return month for an investor group was determined as momen-
tum-based (contrarian-based) strategy. Via the same logic, selling (buying) during a neg-
ative return month was determined as momentum-based (contrarian-based) strategy. 
Momentum score 
In order to shed light on different investor groups’ trading behavior in Chapter 5.2, a 
variable called momentum score was created. A negative score represents contrarian trad-
ing behavior and a positive score represents momentum trading behavior. The absolute 
value of the monthly score represents the geometric change (in percentages) in shares 
owned at the end of the month in question in relation to the previous month. Examples of 
the process of calculating the momentum scores for the High/Low analysis and Monthly 
analysis will be described in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
To give a few examples of this, let’s say households increased their shareholdings from 
1000 to 1005 shares during a month were the stock price of the company set an annual 
high resulting in a geometric change of +.5 % in shareholdings at an annual high. This 
would give households for this month a score of 0.50. If the investor group of financial 
& insurance companies increased their shareholdings from 3000 to 3030 during a month 
that set an annual low for the stock price this would result in a change of +1 % in share-
holdings at an annual low. This would give the group a score of -1.00. For the monthly 
analysis similar procedure was done – if households decreased their ownership from 1000 
to 990 shares during a negative return month, the group would be scored as 1.00 (decrease 
of 1 % in ownership during a negative return month). Therefore the geometric change in 
ownership was multiplied by either 100 or -100 depending on the nature of the change 
with respect to return or annual high/low to get the momentum/contrarian strategy score.  
As a summary, a positive score represents a momentum strategy and a negative score 
represents a contrarian strategy. Imaginary examples of calculating momentum scores for 
a single investor group will be presented in the following tables. 
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Table 2. Example of High/Low analysis and momentum scores (average and median) for 
a time period of 10 years. 
 
Table 3. Example of Monthly analysis and momentum scores (average and median) for 
a time period of 10 months. 
  
Investor group Annual high Annual low
Year 1 2,00 %
Year 2 1,70 %
Year 3 0,40 %
Year 4 1,00 %
Year 5 -4,25 %
Year 6 0,89 %
Year 7 3,23 %
Year 8 1,90 %
Year 9 -3,13 %
Year 10 -2,10 %
Average 1,94 % -1,62 %
Average score 1,944 1,616
Average momentum score 3,56
Median 1,90 % -2,10 %
Median score 1,9 2,1
Median momentum score 4
Investor group Positive return Negative return
Month 1 1,45 %
Month 2 1,20 %
Month 3 1,30 %
Month 4 -2,34 %
Month 5 -2,11 %
Month 6 1,90 %
Month 7 3,10 %
Month 8 0,76 %
Month 9 0,43 %
Month 10 -1,10 %
Average 1,68 % -0,76 %
Average score 1,682 0,764
Average momentum score 2,45
Median 1,45 % -1,10 %
Median score 1,45 1,1
Median momentum score 2,55
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In order to reach the final scores for each investor group, presented in Tables 11 and 12, 
the following procedures were done for the data:  
 High/Low analysis – median and average values for all annual highs and lows 
were calculated and the final median and average momentum scores were the re-
sult of adding two numbers together – in the case of averages, the average value 
of the annual highs was added to the average value of the annual lows and vice 
versa for the median values. Therefore if households on average increased their 
holdings by 1% during annual low months and decreased their holdings by 2% 
during annual high months, households would gain a momentum score of  
-3.00 (-1.00 + -2.00). If an investor group exhibited contrarian trading behavior 
during annual high months and momentum trading behavior during annual low 
months, it would be possible to gain a score of zero. Example of this is presented 
in Table 2. 
 
 Monthly analysis – median and average values for each month were calculated 
with the same logic while instead of using annual high and low months, data was 
collected for each month and months with positive (negative) returns were put in 
the place of annual high (annual low) months. Example of this is presented in 
Table 3.  
One must note that in the above examples (Tables 2 & 3), the sign of the score might be 
the opposite compared to the equity ownership increase/decrease and this is due to ad-
justing for contrarian/momentum trading. A negative (positive) score always represents 
contrarian (momentum) trading while the data points only represent whether the investor 
group increased or decreased their ownership stake in the company. Also, the scores for 
positive (annual high) and negative (annual low) return months are added to each other 
in order to reach the final momentum score, both median and average. Median and aver-
age are both presented as this was deemed to give a more complete view of the investor 
groups’ behavior – especially in smaller case companies the changes in ownership in in-
dividual months might be extreme and therefore might give a distorted view of the reality 
in case of the average momentum score. 
For every buy or sell decision there is a counterparty executing the opposite action of 
selling or buying the stock. For each annual high and low, a momentum score was calcu-
lated for three investor groups, i) financial & Insurance companies, ii) households and iii) 
rest of the world (=foreign ownership). The same procedure was done for the Monthly 
analysis and as an addition, this was done for all six investor groups. A positive momen-
tum score described momentum-based trading while a negative momentum score de-
scribed contrarian-based trading. 
In theory, an optimal strategy for individuals and institutions in the marketplace would 
be to buy stocks at a cheap price and sell them at an expensive price – this is what the 
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momentum/contrarian strategy score should measure – a negative score represents buying 
low and selling high while a positive score represents selling low and buying high. There 
is evidence that momentum strategy can outperform other strategies (Grinblatt et al., 
1995) and by pure mathematics, investors pursuing a long-term contrarian strategy (buy 
low, sell high) should outperform the market. A major limitation of this study is the fact 
that the analysis looks at each investor group in aggregate, not individual investors inside 
the groups. Therefore through the analysis performed in this study, one can not assess 
whether an individual investor sold stocks for loss or gain. Another major limitation of 
the study is the fact that nominee transactions and holdings were excluded from all data 
analysis due to the fact that the ultimate owner/decision-maker is non-identifiable. This 
excludes, for an example, foreign hedge fund holdings and trades. 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
Chapter 5.1 will describe events that were meaningful in size to the data analysis of Chap-
ter 5.2 and 5.3 and therefore such events presented challenges for maintaining the preci-
sion of the data analysis. Here, using the same order in company presentation as in the 
data analysis of Chapters 5.2 and 5.3, exclusions and adjustments made to the data anal-
ysis and their rationale will be described. Events that were deemed meaningful and in 
need of adjustments were stock splits, share issues, share buybacks and ownership ar-
rangements related to acquisitions or the specifics of government ownership reorganiza-
tions. All nominee holdings are excluded from each company’s ownership structure as 
well as all the changes in ownership structure due to nominee transactions. Therefore 
nominee holdings do not show up in Chapter 5.2 and nominee transactions are not ac-
counted for in the analysis of investor group trading behavior in Chapter 5.3. 
In Chapter 5.2 ownership structures of the case companies will be demonstrated by two 
charts for each case company. The first one of the charts will present the ownership stakes 
held by the investor groups monthly as a percentage of the total shares outstanding and 
an adjusted monthly closing price chart (data points for the last day of each month) sepa-
rately for each company. The second company-specific chart will present ownership 
stakes in terms of market value of the shares held by the investor groups at the end of 
each month combined with monthly closing prices. As trading between investor groups 
changes the ownership structure of the company in question, findings from Chapter 5.2 
will somewhat overlap with Chapter 5.3, which focuses more on investor groups’ behav-
ior. Both of these two charts for each company follow the same methodology by using 
data values for the end of each calendar month. All of the share prices are adjusted prices 
obtained from NASDAQ Helsinki. 
Chapter 5.3 will discuss the data analysis of investor groups’ trading behavior and the 
Chapter will have 2 distinct sections, the High/Low analysis and the Monthly analysis. 
The former will investigate Financial-Insurance investor group, Household investor 
group and Rest-World investor group and their trading only during the months where the 
stock in question set an annual high or low (calendar year) while the latter investigates 
monthly trading data of all six investor groups.  
5.1 Company events warranting adjustments to the analysis 
The data has been adjusted or excluded from multiple companies’ trading data analysis 
(Chapter 5.3), each of these are explained in further detail in Chapter 5.1. All information 
for these exclusions and their rationale has been obtained from official company reports. 
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Small increases in shares outstanding, such as employees and/or board members exercis-
ing their options or receiving stock grants, have very slight and negligible effects (if not 
specifically stated otherwise) on ownership structure changes, which is why these have 
not been adjusted for in the data analysis. Small increase in shares outstanding is deter-
mined in this study as a smaller than one percentage point increase in the total share count. 
This increase in shares was determined as small enough to not cause a significant differ-
ence in the trading figures. In general, all share buybacks are actual transactions where 
the company purchases shares from a current investor and therefore the only adjustments 
made in cases, where the companies performed major buybacks or retirements of shares 
(the largest such actor being Nokia) that were held by the company itself required adjust-
ments only for the case company’s own investor group, the Non-Financial companies’ 
investor group.  Company specific events and narratives related to them will be presented 
next. 
Nokia 
Nokia split the stock multiple times during the observed time period and corrective ad-
justments have been made, where possible, in the data analysis in the following months: 
April 1998 – stock was split 1:1, April 1999 – stock was split and there was an equity 
issue, therefore this month has been excluded from the Monthly analysis, April 2000 – 
stock was split 1:3. Nokia had multiple buyback programs and therefore the momentum 
scores of Non-Financial Companies investor group might not be reflective of the true 
nature of the investor group as buybacks distort the actions of this group. In order to adjust 
for the major buybacks during multiple months by Non-Financial investor group’s (=buy-
backs) change in ownership has been excluded from the Monthly analysis, these months 
were April&May 2004, April 2005, April 2007, March 2009 and February 2015. As the 
company has had ongoing buyback programs, the data for Non-Financial companies’ in-
vestor behavior can not accurately describe the behavior of the group as one can not dis-
tinguish all buybacks from other companies’ purchases with precision. Nokia issued large 
blocks of shares (representing over 1 % of the amount of shares outstanding during the 
respective months) in November 2015 and February 2016 and therefore these months 
have been excluded from the Monthly analysis (neither set an annual high or low).  
Nokia entered into a merger agreement with Alcatel-Lucent in 2015 and as a part of the 
purchase price issued 1.5 billion shares to Alcatel-Lucent shareholders in January 2016 – 
this month happened to have the annual high of Nokia’s share price and therefore the 
changes in ownership of all investor groups for this month have been excluded from the 
data analysis. This was deemed appropriate due to the diverse base of Alcatel-Lucent 
shareholders as this made it impossible to differentiate between marketplace activity by 
investor groups and directed share issues to investor groups.  
Of all the case companies Nokia was the largest by market cap on average during the 
study time period. Nokia is also listed in New York Stock Exchange, which provides a 
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platform for more international investors interest than the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
Nokia also had the highest ownership share of institutional investors averaging over 80 
% (82.33 %) of the total amount of shares outstanding during the time period with nomi-
nee shareholdings included in the calculation. These nominee shareholdings are com-
pletely excluded from the following data analysis. 
Kone 
The time frame used for Kone was June 2005 to December 2016 due to the fact that Kone 
and Cargotec were split into two different, independent companies in May 2005. The data 
analysis includes Kone B shares and excludes Kone A shares as the latter are not listed 
on Helsinki Stock Exchange while the former are. The stock was split 1:1 in November 
2005 with the rationale of increasing the liquidity of the stock. The stock was split 1:1 in 
again February 2008 resulting in the total amount of shares outstanding doubling in 
amount. The stock was split 1:1 for a third time during the study time frame in December 
2013 resulting in the total amount of shares doubling in amount. These three splits result 
in every original B share becoming 8 shares during the time period so the share amount 
increased by 700 % due to the splits. Each month, where a split was completed, a correc-
tive adjustment was made to the Monthly analysis and no adjustment was needed for the 
High/Low analysis due to none of these months setting annual highs or lows.  
During the whole time period the share amount increased by 730 % - the 700 % are ex-
plained by splits and the rest, 30 %, can be explained mainly by employee, executive and 
board compensation schemes. The only month excluded from the Monthly analysis was 
May 2010 due to an equity issue increasing the total amount of shares outstanding by over 
1 percent.  
Sampo 
Sampo has two share classes, A and B. The data used for Sampo includes only A-shares  
that are listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMX Helsinki), the differences between 
A- and B-shares being that they have 1 and 5 votes, respectively, and the amount of shares 
(as of December 31st 2016) 534 million and 1.2 million, respectively. Increases in share 
count did not have a major effect in shareholder composition with the following  two 
exceptions of ownership changes by the government ownership reorganization (Leonia) 
and the all-share merger deal with Mandatum. 
The shares were split 1:3 (an increase of 300 % in the amount of shares outstanding) in 
October 1997 and this has been adjusted for in the Monthly data analysis. The shares were 
split again in April 2001 (1:4) increasing the share count by 400 %. This has also been 
adjusted for in the Monthly data analysis.  Adjustments were made for major events, share 
issues as well as share buybacks, which will be explained next. Corrective adjustments 
were necessary for the company’s buyback program on the following months: June 2000, 
April 2003, April 2006, May 2008 and November 2008. For all of the abovementioned 
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months, the changes in Financial-Insurance companies investor group have been ex-
cluded from the Monthly data analysis (none set annual highs or lows) and the November 
2008 buyback was completely excluded from the Monthly data analysis due to its major 
effect on all investor groups’ shareholdings. In January of 2001 the company issued ap-
proximately 14.7 million new shares increasing the total amount of shares outstanding by 
over 2.5 percent and therefore the month was excluded completely from the Monthly data 
analysis (did not set an annual high or low). Other major events during the study period, 
the merger with Mandatum and the exchange of the government’s shareholdings in Leo-
nia into Sampo shares will be discussed in the following two paragraphs. 
The sudden jump in the shareholdings of the Finnish Government in the beginning of 
2001 is explained as follows. The Finnish Government owned Leonia Oyj, owner of a 
government-owned bank Postipankki, or Postisäästöpankki, which merged with the in-
surance company Sampo in 2000. The letter of intent for this merger was signed in Octo-
ber 1999 and Eduskunta, the Finnish Parliament, agreed that the Government may switch 
Leonia shares  into Sampo shares according to the deal. In January 2001 44.72 million 
Sampo A-shares (listed on OMX Helsinki) were issued to the Government therefore hav-
ing a major impact on the shareholder composition of the company as reported by the 
Helsinki Exchange. This has been adjusted for in the Monthly data analysis (the month 
did not set an annual high or low).  
In 2001 February, the share set a calendar-year high for the year 2001. During this month, 
the shareholdings by households increased by over 100 % over the previous month and 
this is explained next. Sampo and Mandatum Bank boards entered into a merger agree-
ment (Mandatum merger) between the two parties where the purchase agreement was 
settled as an all-share deal, where Sampo acted as the buyer and Mandatum as the seller. 
This merger increased the total amount of A-shares of Sampo by 7.1 million shares that 
were issued to the former shareholders of Mandatum Bank. This resulted in households’ 
shareholdings of Sampo increasing from 3.1 million to 6.5 million. Due to this month 
being an annual high of the stock price this month was excluded from both parts of the 
data analysis. This is due to the major changes in ownership stakes of households and 
other groups that do not represent actual buying activity as well as the fact that exact issue 
amounts to different shareholder groups are not public data.  
UPM-Kymmene 
UPM entered into an agreement in May 2001 to purchase a German paper manufacturer 
Haindl including four manufacturing plants in Germany and Austria – this deal was 
funded by a combination of cash and equity and the board of UPM agreed in September 
2001 to issue 12.3 million shares to Haindl shareholders. This transaction was completed 
in November 2001 and the effect of the share issue has been excluded from the data anal-
ysis by a corrective adjustment. UPM-Kymmene (then Repola Oy) performed a convert-
ible debt issue in 1994 and this resulted in the count of shares outstanding increasing by 
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a total of 7.3 million shares during the time frame of 1994-2003 – no adjustments were 
made for these new shares as the conversions were very diffusely spread along the time 
frame and very small in size in terms of monthly conversions. Starting from January 1997 
until the stock split in March 2003, the shares outstanding increased by 27.1 million which 
was mainly a result of the Haindl deal and the Repola convertible debt, the two accounting 
for over two thirds of the new shares. The assumption that the rest of the increase was a 
result of compensation schemes was made as the company has actively engaged in such 
schemes while being a publicly traded company.  
Other adjustments and exclusions made in the data analysis for UPM-Kymmene were 
made as follows: five months with major equity issues; April 1998, May 2005, May 2007, 
May 2008 and August 2011 (all five months excluded completely from Monthly analysis 
and May 2005 excluded from the High/Low analysis). The company had an active share 
buyback program during the time period of the study and therefore the following adjust-
ments have been made: December 2007, April 2011 and May 2011 were adjusted by 
excluding the Non-Financial companies investor groups’ monthly data from the Monthly 
analysis and for May 2011 the same was done for the High/Low analysis as this month 
set the annual high for the year 2011.  
Finnair 
Finnair has been described as a strategic holding for the Finnish Government, which is 
why the General-Government group has a majority holding in the company and therefore 
the company’s equity free float is smaller than in other cases. Two months were excluded 
from the Monthly analysis due to significant share issues impacting the total number of 
shares outstanding by over 1 percent and these months were September 1998 and October 
2005. Finnair decided to enhance the company’s balance sheet in 2007 and did so by 
issuing new equity to current shareholders and thereby receiving a capital injection of 243 
million euros. This was completed in December 2007 and therefore this month has been 
excluded from both parts of the data analysis (the month also set the annual low for the 
stock price in 2007).  
Stockmann 
Stockmann has a dual class share structure and both of the shares, class A and class B, 
are listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. As of December 31st 2016 there were 30.5 
million class A shares and 41.5 million class B shares and the only material difference 
between class A and class B is that class A shares entitle the owners to 10 votes while B 
class shares entitle the owners to 1 vote. Therefore class A share ownership determines 
who exerts corporate control and as the A shares are dispersely owned, so is the control 
of the company dispersely spread. The data analysis includes B shares while excluding 
the A shares completely from the analysis.  
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Stockmann decided to split the stock 1:2 in May 1998, tripling the amount of shares out-
standing and the data analysis’ results are adjusted for this change. During the time frame 
of the study, Stockmann had multiple rights and equity issues resulting in major changes 
in shares outstanding during the following months: June 1998, June 2008, August and 
September of 2009 and June 2011. The former 5 months were excluded from the Monthly 
analysis (no effect on the High/Low analysis) due to the major effect on ownership struc-
ture changes that can not be adjusted for with proper reliability contrary to the change 
resulting from stock split.  
Saga Furs 
Saga Furs has two classes of shares, A and C. The company is controlled by the FFBA, 
local and national fur breeders’ associations. By market cap, Saga Furs is the smallest of 
the case companies. The data analysis was performed using data concerning Saga Furs 
class C shares, which are listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange while the class A shares are 
not listed. Saga Furs had no changes in shares outstanding during the time frame of the 
study. Therefore no adjustments for specific months were necessary.  
 
5.2 Ownership structures 
This Chapter will present data about case companies’ ownership structure and it’s evolve-
ment over time during the study time period. The market value of different investor 
groups’ shareholdings will also be presented with companies’ adjusted stock price data. 
The market value of the groups’ shareholdings correlates very strongly with the stock 
price movements due to the fact that changes in stock ownership are rather minor on a 
monthly basis compared to the changes in stock price on a monthly basis. All of the data 
related to a single case company will be presented and discussed and subsequently the 
section moves into the next company, starting with Nokia moving into Kone, Sampo, 
UPM-Kymmene, Finnair, Stockmann and lastly Saga Furs (Chapter 5.2 will follow the 
same sequence).  
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Nokia 
Chart 1. Monthly ownership structure of Nokia, 1995-2016.  
Nokia’s ownership structure over 22 year time period is presented in Chart 1. Nokia has 
been one of the largest and most traded equities in Helsinki Stock Exchange during the 
time period. Institutional ownership in Nokia peaked in January 1997 at over 24 %, in 
December 1999 at over 23.8 % just before the dot-com bubble burst. The subsequent 
decline in institutional ownership is consistent with herding behavior of institutional in-
vestors (Grinblatt et al., 1995). This period shows momentum strategy employed over the 
long-term by institutional investors as supported by Wermers’ (1997) paper. When nom-
inee shareholdings are included in the calculation, institutional ownership averaged over 
82 percent during the time period.  The high share of institutional ownership is typical for 
a large cap (high market capitalization, or high market value) company consistent with 
literature (Sias, 1996; Gompers and Metrick 2001). During the time period there has been 
major variance in the ownership stakes of both the Non-Profit and Rest-World groups. 
Ownership stakes of the General-Government group has been smallwhile the large vari-
ance in Non-Financial group’s ownership being mostly the result of buyback programs in 
which the company has retired the shares that have been bought back. 
 
Table 4. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Nokia by inves-
tor groups, 1995-2016.  
Nokia Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 24.25 % January-97 5.41 % March-06 11.07 %
General-Government 25.38 % September-12 6.33 % March-06 15.38 %
Households 48.43 % August-95 21.06 % April-99 39.61 %
Non-Financial 49.34 % March-06 5.04 % April-07 15.00 %
Non-Profit 22.68 % December-02 5.78 % December-16 12.85 %
Rest-World 21.14 % April-98 1.00 % September-99 6.09 %
Maximum Minimum
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As presented in Table 4, households have averaged the highest share of ownership in 
terms of non-nominee shareholdings through the time period averaging over 39 percent. 
The variance in institutional ownership looks artificially low because of the statistics in-
cluding only non-nominee shareholdings as foreign investors hold the majority of their 
share in nominee arrangements with Finnish financial institutions or companies incorpo-
rated in Finland. The enormous variance in Non-Financial companies’ ownership be-
tween 5 and 49 percent is explained by Nokia’s large share buyback program, which in-
cluded retiring the bought back shares. Foreign direct ownership peaked in April 1998 at 
21.1 percent while  averaging only 6.1 percent. The Finnish Government has played a 
role in Nokia’s ownership through minority shareholdings, with the highest stake at 25.4 
percent in September 2012 and averaging 15.4 % during the time period. Non-Profits had 
significant ownership stakes as well hitting an all-time high at almost 27 percent in De-
cember 2002 and averaging almost 13 percent during the time period.  
As a summary, Nokia’s shareholder composition remained rather stable during the time 
period, the Finnish Government increasing it’s ownership stake towards the end of the 
time period. Household investors were major holders of the non-nominee listed share-
holdings of the company. The step-function changes in Non-Financial companies’ own-
ership stake are explained by the company’s share buyback program. Alcatel-Lucent ac-
quisition explains the increase in Rest-World group (=foreign investors) ownership stake 
in January 2016.  
 
Chart 2. Monthly ownership stakes in Nokia (logarithmic left-hand axis values in million 
euros) and closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Chart 2 represents the investor groups’ shareholdings market values while showing the 
stock price during the study time period. The above chart and all of the following charts 
do not represent 100 % of the total amount of shares outstanding (nominee shareholdings 
excluded) and therefore equity values of the charts do not equal the respective company’s 
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market capitalization values. Nokia’s stock price peaked during the dot-com boom and 
has declined significantly afterwards. For the whole time period from 2010 to 2016 the 
stock has traded below it’s minimum price between 1999 and 2008, being rather stagnant. 
The dot-com boom ended in 2000 resulting in a crisis for many technology companies 
including Nokia. An interesting feature of the household investors during this time, sup-
ported by many published papers (Kaniel et al., 2008; Kaniel et al., 2012; Barrot et al., 
2016), is that they provided liquidity during the crisis and were major net-sellers of Nokia 
equity from September 1999 to May 2001. During the 21 month time period, there were 
4 months, where households were net buyers, on average increasing their ownership stake 
by  0.62 % and 17 months, where they were net sellers, on average decreasing their stake 
by 1.38 %. For non-nominee institutional investor shareholdings the same pattern re-
peated, only in a greater magnitude supported by De Haan and Kakes’ (2011) findings in 
the Dutch market. For the same time period as stated above, institutional investors in-
creased their stake during 3 months by on average 1.55 % while decreasing their stake 
during 18 months by on average 5.52 %. This represents a large contrarian tendency, 
where hubris dominated equity markets, especially in technology stocks, and households 
as well as domestic institutional investors (non-nominee transactions) were able to dis-
pose stocks at very high prices.  
Kone 
Chart 3. Monthly ownership structure of Kone class B shares, 5/2005-2016.  
Kone’s ownership structure by investor group shares held during the time period after 
separating from Cargotec is presented in Chart 3. It is a family-controlled company and 
the controlling family is the Finnish Herlin family. The ownership stakes of different in-
vestor groups have stayed very consistent throughout the 11.5 year time period. Govern-
ment, Non-Profit and institutional investor groups have had rather small ownership stakes 
while Non-Financial companies (mainly the Herlin family stake) and household investors 
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have on average held over 65 % of the shares during the study time period. Foreign in-
vestors’ ownership stake dropped dramatically in 2015 to less than 3 % of all of the non-
nominee shareholdings and haz been stagnant since. One must take into account, that 
control is exerted by the Herlin family due to their ownership of class A shares, which 
are not listed and have more votes (1 compared with 0.1) than the class B shares. 
 
Table 5. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Kone by investor 
groups, 5/2005-2016.  
As seen in Table 5, the ownership stakes of all investor groups have stayed very constant 
over the study period. The variance of ownership stakes inside the investor groups’ hold-
ings has been very small in all groups except the Rest-World, or foreign investors, group, 
ranging between 2 and 14 percent during the time period.   
Chart 4. Monthly ownership stakes in Kone class B shares (logarithmic left-hand axis 
values in million euros) and closing prices, 6/2005-2016.  
Kone’s share price has increased constantly over the study period while slumping slightly 
during and after the financial crisis besides a few little slumps between 2013 and 2016. 
As the price has grown steadily while the investor groups’ ownership stakes have held 
steady, the ownership stakes’ market values have been growing very steadily over the 
11.5 year time period. While Kone has grown into one of the largest capitalization com-
panies in the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the time period, the ownership stake held 
Kone Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 7.20 % November-13 3.05 % April-09 4.68 %
General-Government 12.27 % May-08 7.22 % May-15 9.67 %
Households 27.00 % July-15 20.59 % November-07 23.42 %
Non-Financial 49.75 % October-16 39.04 % October-09 42.12 %
Non-Profit 10.61 % May-05 8.86 % November-13 9.53 %
Rest-World 14.23 % March-09 2.47 % August-15 10.58 %
Maximum Minimum
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by institutional investors has not grown significantly (peaking in November 2013 at 7.2 
%). Paper by Fernando et al. (2014) supports this as they found that institutional investors 
are reluctant to invest in family-controlled companies.  
Sampo 
Chart 5. Monthly ownership structure of Sampo class A shares, 7/1997-2016.  
Chart 5 represents the ownership stakes in Sampo held by different investor groups during 
the time period. The two largest changes in ownership have occurred due to the actions 
of the Finnish Government – first converting it’s ownership of Leonia into Sampo shares 
resulting in the major increase in government ownership in January 2001 and second sub-
sequent decline in ownership over time between June 2003 (75 percent) and December 
2008 (28.2 percent) as the Government has disposed the majority of it’s ownership stake 
in the company in the marketplace. Large ownership stakes during the time period have 
been held by institutional investors, the Finnish government and Non-Financial compa-
nies investor group. The large step-change in ownership structure that occurred between 
November and December 2008 was a result of the government transferring the ownership 
of approx. 79 million shares from the government to the government’s investment vehicle 
Solidium, which is a Non-Financial company according to Euroclear’s definition. There-
fore this change does not represent a true ownership change.  
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Table 6. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Sampo by  
investor groups, 1997-2016.  
Table 6 shows the maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes of the investor 
groups in percentages. Institutional investors (including shares held by the company it-
self) held the majority of the stock in July 1997 with a 50.5 % ownership stake of all the 
non-nominee shareholdings while averaging an ownership stake of 12.6 % over the study 
time period. Direct shareholdings by the Finnish government ranged between 75.6 (No-
vember 2002) and 9.9 percent (July 1997) during the time period. Non-Profit and Rest-
World groups have had very minor and non-significant ownership stakes in Sampo during 
the study time period. The variance in household investors’ shareholdings has been large, 
ranging between 26.7 (June 2016) and 4.2 percent (January 2001) and averaging 17.7 
percent during the study time period.  
Chart 6. Monthly ownership stakes in Sampo (left-hand axis values in million euros) and 
closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Sampo’s market value has increased enormously during the time period between 1997 
and 2016 reflected in Chart 6. The financial crisis and the dot-com boom hit Sampo’s 
share price, however not as hard as Nokia’s share price was hit. From 2003 to 2016 the 
company’s market value has increased approximately 600 % resulting in major share-
holder value creation over time. This wealth has spread very well amongst the investor 
Sampo Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 50.51 % July-97 7.29 % October-01 12.63 %
General-Government 75.58 % November-02 9.93 % July-97 39.22 %
Households 26.72 % June-16 4.15 % January-01 17.74 %
Non-Financial 52.26 % June-98 4.74 % October-06 25.55 %
Non-Profit 5.41 % August-14 0.71 % July-97 3.33 %
Rest-World 4.91 % July-16 0.01 % July-97 1.54 %
Maximum Minimum
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groups as the variance in each groups’ shareholdings has been small and therefore the 
ownership stakes of different groups have stayed rather constant. Institutional ownership 
has been rather small, most likely due to the fact that the majority of institutional owners 
hold their shares in nominee accounts, which are absent from this data. 
UPM-Kymmene 
Chart 7. Monthly ownership structure of UPM-Kymmene, 1995-2016.  
Chart 7 expresses the ownership stakes held by different investor groups in UPM-Kym-
mene during the study time period. The step-function changes of ownership in late 2001 
and late 2007 are the results of the Haindl acquisition in 2001, where equity was issued 
to foreign investors as part of the financing of the deal, and the company’s share buyback 
program in 2007 including the retirement of the bought back shares. Otherwise, the non-
nominee shareholdings of all investor groups have stayed rather constant during the study 
time period. 
 
Table 7. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in UPM-Kymmene 
by investor groups, 1996-2016.  
UPM-Kymmene Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 25.63 % June-96 8.70 % June-07 14.98 %
General-Government 22.73 % November-11 11.99 % December-01 18.34 %
Households 46.91 % June-16 22.26 % April-96 38.55 %
Non-Financial 24.02 % May-96 4.56 % June-02 9.37 %
Non-Profit 20.53 % February-07 9.94 % April-96 15.28 %
Rest-World 14.76 % June-02 1.34 % December-98 3.48 %
Maximum Minimum
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Ownership stakes’ maximum, minimum and average percentage values are presented in 
Table 7. The largest shareholders during the study time period have been household in-
vestors, the Finnish Government, Non-Profit group and institutional owners with average 
ownership stakes (of non-nominee shareholdings) of 38.6, 18.3, 15.3 and 15.0 percent, 
respectively. Variance of ownership within the investor groups has been small when tak-
ing the buyback program and Haindl acquisition into account. The most relevant variance 
has been in the institutional ownership, which has ranged between the minimum of 8.7 
percent in June 2007 and the maximum of 25.6 percent in June 1996. There has been no 
majority shareholder group present during the study time period.  
Chart 8. Monthly ownership stakes in UPM Kymmene (left-hand axis values in million 
euros) and closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Chart 8 represents investor groups’ shareholdings value over the study period as well as 
the stock’s share price. As UPM-Kymmene (later referenced to as UPM) operates in a 
cyclical industry and this has resulted in large variance in the stock price during the time 
period. The company’s share price performance was very poor before and shortly after 
the financial crisis like other large capitalization case companies hitting it’s all-time low 
of 4.35 € per share on the 31st of March, 2009. The stock price has has risen more than 
400 percent from the bottom of 2009 to a new all-time high of 23.34 € in the end of 2016. 
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Finnair 
Chart 9. Monthly ownership structure of Finnair, 1995-2016.  
The ownership structure of Finnair is presented in Chart 9, where one can observe the 
company being government-controlled as the Finnish government has held the majority 
of the equity for the whole time period of the study. Foreign, institutional and household 
investors have played very small roles in the ownership of Finnair (non-nominee share-
holdings) during the study time period. Finnair has been deemed a strategic company for 
the Finnish government and therefore the government has not disposed it’s majority po-
sition in the company contrary to the government’s stake in Sampo. 
 
 
Table 8. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Finnair by  
investor groups, 1995-2016.  
The Finnish government has on average owned over three fourths (78.7 %) of Finnair 
stock as represented in Table 8. The variance in ownership of all other investor groups 
has been large, which can  be partly explained by the company stock’s small amount of 
free float and small stakes by non-government investors. Institutional investors and 
household investors have on average held 8.0 and 7.3 percent of the non-nominee share-
Finnair Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 13.74 % April-08 2.43 % April-06 7.98 %
General-Government 87.12 % March-06 72.14 % August-02 78.76 %
Households 16.13 % November-16 2.32 % December-97 7.25 %
Non-Financial 0.64 % April-13 0.02 % December-10 0.06 %
Non-Profit 1.88 % August-05 0.32 % June-98 0.82 %
Rest-World 11.98 % March-08 0.01 % March-95 5.14 %
Maximum Minimum
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holdings, respectively. Households held their maximum stake of 16.1 percent and insti-
tutional investors their maximum stake of 13.7 percent in November 2016 and April 2008, 
respectively. 
Chart 10. Monthly ownership stakes in Finnair (left-hand axis values in million euros) 
and closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Chart 10 represents Finnair’s stock price combined with the investor groups’ sharehold-
ings’ market values. The total market value of the equity hit 868 million euros in January 
2007. Operating in the airline industry, Finnair is highly reliant on kerosene prices and 
therefore the price of oil has major implications for the company’s financial performance. 
The high price of oil resulted in the deterioration of the company’s business results and 
prospects around the time of the financial crisis and the company’s share price has been 
stagnant ever since 2008.  
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Stockmann 
Chart 11. Monthly ownership structure of Stockmann B shares, 1995-2016.   
Chart 11 presents the shareholdings of all investor groups as percentage values of the 
amount of B shares outstanding. The large jump in Non-Financial investor group holdings 
in August 2009 was a result of a directed share issue to HTT Holding Oy Ab, a holding 
company owned by the Finnish Hartwall family. Another share issue was performed by 
the company in September 2009 which was subscribed to by all investor groups rather 
evenly and therefore not resulting in major jumps in the shareholdings by investor group. 
Other than these events there were no major monthly changes in stock ownership, how-
ever the shareholdings by different investor groups fluctuated significantly over the study 
time period. 
 
Table 9. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Stockmann by 
investor groups, 1995-2016.  
In Table 9, the maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes of investor groups are 
presented in percentage values of the amount of shares outstanding (B class). Stock-
mann’s shares were widely dispersed across all investor groups with four groups total 
average ownership stake during the study period at 90 percent. Foreign investors and in-
stitutional investors were the two groups with the least significant holdings in Stockmann, 
Stockmann Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 16.64 % April-98 4.26 % August-12 9.87 %
General-Government 22.87 % December-16 7.05 % April-14 16.43 %
Households 33.90 % October-13 19.87 % October-01 25.90 %
Non-Financial 28.33 % April-14 11.79 % June-09 19.35 %
Non-Profit 35.78 % March-05 17.27 % December-16 27.91 %
Rest-World 1.03 % June-09 0.29 % October-14 0.52 %
Maximum Minimum
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institutional investors averaging just below 10 percent and foreign investors averaging 
0.5 percent stakes of all non-nominee shareholdings in the B share class of Stockmann. 
Non-Profit and Households investor groups had the highest average stakes in the com-
pany during the study time period with 27.9 percent and 25.9 percent stakes, respectively. 
The Finnish Government and Non-Financial companies’ investor group were significant 
shareholders in Stockmann B shares as well with their stakes averaging 16.4 and 19.4 
percent, respectively. The Government’s stake hit it’s all-time high in December 2016, 
the end of the study time period, at 22.9 percent.  
Chart 12. Monthly ownership stakes in Stockmann class B shares (left-hand axis values 
in million euros) and closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Chart 12 represents Stockmann B shares stock price as well as investor groups’ share-
holdings market value during the study period time. The stock price decreased greatly 
during 2008 and 2011 and has since kept declining to the end of the time period. Institu-
tional ownership was relatively high, at a local maximum of 13.3 percent of all non-nom-
inee shareholdings in June 2008 just after the stock price had started to decline from all-
time high levels. This is in line with literature describing institutional investors as mo-
mentum strategy driven investors (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1997). Research by 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) does not support such momentum strategy behavior for 
Finnish institutional investors. 
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Saga Furs 
Chart 13. Monthly ownership structure of Saga Furs class C shares, 1995-2016.  
Chart 13 presents the monthly ownership stakes of all investor groups across the study 
time period as percentages. General-Government and Non-Profit groups’ ownership has 
been rather steady during the 22 year time period while the other investor groups’ share-
holdings have varied greatly in size. The Finnish Government has played next to no role 
in Saga Furs ownership while Finnish Fur Breeders’ Association (FFBA), the controlling 
shareholder party of Saga Furs has had a large and steady ownership stake in the company 
during the time period. Local and national (Finnish) fur breeders’ associations hold the 
majority of the A shares in the company, the A shares entitling owners to 12 votes com-
pared to the C shares 1 vote for each share, respectively. Institutional investors as well as 
foreign investors have had very little exposure to Saga Furs in terms of shares held, both 
groups having very small ownership stakes in the company. 
 
 
Table 10. Monthly maximum, minimum and average ownership stakes in Saga Furs by 
investor groups, 1995-2016.  
Table 10 represents the maximum, minimum and average values of ownership stakes held 
by different investor groups across the study time period. Non-Profit group, as described 
Saga Furs Average
%-value Date %-value Date
Financial-Insurance 11.27 % October-97 0.09 % November-11 3.36 %
General-Government 3.03 % August-97 0.00 % November-00 0.50 %
Households 44.89 % January-13 16.12 % March-98 30.46 %
Non-Financial 38.47 % December-96 8.58 % September-07 14.25 %
Non-Profit 52.90 % July-97 33.74 % October-95 42.94 %
Rest-World 15.23 % July-02 1.22 % February-97 8.50 %
Maximum Minimum
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earlier, has had the most significant role as an owner in the company with an average of 
42.9 percent ownership stake in the non-nominee class C shares held during the study 
time period. Households and Non-Financial companies were the two other significant 
investor groups in Saga Furs with ownership stakes averaging 30.5 and 14.3 percent dur-
ing the study time period. There was major variance in the ownership stakes of house-
holds, institutional investors, foreign investors and Non-Financial companies’ investor 
group. Households’ ownership stake ranged between the minimum of 16.1 percent in 
March 1998 and the maximum of 44.9 percent in January 2013. The Non-Financial 
group’s ownership stake ranged between the minimum of 8.6 percent in September 2007 
and the maximum of 38.5 percent in December 1996. The company was controlled during 
the whole time period by fur breeders’ associations through a similar ownership stake 
organization as Kone, where non-listed class A shares enabled the associations to hold 
the majority of the votes within the company.  
Chart 14. Monthly ownership stakes in Saga Furs class C shares (logarithmic left-hand 
axis values in million euros) and closing prices, 1997-2016.  
Chart 14 presents Saga Furs C shares’ monthly price data with different investor groups 
shareholdings market value over a time period of 20 years. The chart shows that institu-
tional investors’ interest in the stock next to vanished in 2011, also present in Chart 13. 
This finding in institutional investors’ trading behavior is supported by the findings of 
Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1997). The role of household investors in the com-
pany’s share has been very significant as of the whole May 2011 to December 2016 time 
period, constantly staying above 40 percent of all non-nominee shareholdings.  
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5.3 Investor groups’ trading behavior 
This Chapter will follow the order of the case companies established in Chapter 5.1. Ta-
bles showing the main findings of companies’ High/Low analysis and Monthly analysis 
will be presented respectively, according to the case order established in Chapters 5.1. 
Examples of how the momentum scores are calculated were presented in the latter part of 
Chapter 4.3. In all of the following tables and analysis one must note that nominee share-
holdings are completely excluded from the analysis and therefore the majority of large 
foreign investors’ data is not included. The institutional investors group (Financial-Insur-
ance) is more representative of Finnish institutional investors than a global set of institu-
tional investors. 
High/Low analysis 
Table 11. The High/Low analysis for all case companies with average and median mo-
mentum scores for each investor group. 
Table 11 represents the findings of the High/Low analysis for each case company and for 
three investor groups, Financial-Insurance companies (=institutional investors), House-
holds group (=household investors) and Rest-World group (=foreign investors). Each of 
these values is calculated using only non-nominee shareholdings’ data. In order to reach 
momentum scores’ median and average values, only two months data for each year was 
used, the month that set the year-high stock price and the month that set the year-low 
stock price. An example of such calculation is done in Table 2 located in Chapter 4.3 for 
reference of the methodology used. 
Institutional investors seem to have different tendencies of trading behavior depending 
on which company they are investing in according to Table 11 momentum scores. In the 
cases of UPM-Kymmene and Kone, institutional investors had a strong preference for 
momentum trading during the study time period’s annual stock price high and low 
months. A similar pattern can be observed in the case of Stockmann, however here the 
median momentum score is only 0.28 which leaves the data inconclusive of any strong 
indication of momentum trading. This type of momentum trading by institutional inves-
tors is supported by literature (Grinblatt et al. 1995; Wermers, 1997). 
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Median -5.60 1.63 -0.98 1.48 0.05 0.28 0.00
Average -5.54 2.17 -1.94 5.51 -4.00 3.85 -10.10
Median -0.40 -0.61 -0.40 -1.84 -2.13 -1.12 -0.55
Average -0.16 -1.12 -0.73 -1.91 -1.53 -0.79 -0.02
Median -9.41 -0.01 -3.39 -6.25 0.31 0.52 0.00
Average -2.22 1.98 -10.31 -7.34 2.40 2.52 -31.78
Financial-Insurance
Households
Rest-World
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Institutional investors seemed to trade using a contrarian trading strategy in annual high 
and low months in the cases of Nokia, Sampo, Finnair and Saga Furs. The median and 
average momentum scores in the case of Nokia were -5.60  and -5.54, respectively, rep-
resenting very heavy tendency for contrarian trading.  The momentum scores for institu-
tional investors’ trading in Sampo were uniformly negative as well with lesser values of 
just below -1 and -2 for median and average values, respectively. In the cases of Finnair 
and Saga Furs, the institutional ownership was rather small during the study time period 
with little trading action compared to the other case companies, resulting in median mo-
mentum score values of 0.05 (Finnair) and 0.00 (Saga Furs) and average momentum 
scores of -4.00 (Finnair) and -10.10 (Saga Furs) representing contrarian trading tendency 
to a lesser extent than in the case of Nokia, where the ownership stake of institutional 
investors was considerably larger in market values. This sort of contrarian trading ten-
dency of institutional investors has support from Dutch and Finnish research (De Haan 
and Kakes, 2011; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000), however there exists contrary findings 
from the American research (Grinblatt et al. 1995; Wermers, 1997). 
Table 11 shows clearly that household investors have a contrarian strategy, represented 
by negative momentum scores across all case companies, towards each of the case com-
panies. This contrarian trading tendency manifests itself in different levels of strength 
with the strongest contrarian trading patterns occurring in Finnair and UPM-Kymmene 
with median momentum scores of -2.13 and -1.84, respectively and average momentum 
scores of -1.53 and -1.84, respectively. The smaller values of momentum scores of house-
hold investors compared to institutional investors are perhaps explained by the following 
facts. This contrarian trading tendency of household investors is supported by past find-
ings in the Finnish marketplace (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). 
The number of household investors is vastly greater than the amount of institutional in-
vestors in the data set, as well as the fact that the average shareholding per each such 
investor is vastly smaller for household investors compared to institutional investors. 
Large block trading of institutional investors might lead into greater momentum scores 
present in Table 11. Another factor that might explain such differences in values could be 
that institutional investors are more sophisticated and therefore act more rationally and 
more uniformly in the months where stock prices hit their annual highs and lows. 
Foreign investors, represented by Rest-World group in Table 11, have both negative and 
positive value momentum scores across the case companies. The absolute values of these 
are vastly greater than the values of household investors, perhaps explained by the small 
shareholdings (as of percentage of all non-nominee shareholdings) of the group as well 
as the fact that foreign investors portfolios tend to be greater in value than those of do-
mestic household investors. Foreign investors had very large negative median and aver-
age momentum scores, representing contrarian trading strategy, in the cases of Nokia  
(-9.41 and -2.22, respectively), Sampo (-3.39 and -10.31) and UPM-Kymmene (-6.25 and 
-7.34). These contrarian findings for foreign investors are contrary to those of Grinblatt 
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and Keloharju (2000) in the Finnish marketplace although they studied all foreign inves-
tors as a group, including foreign institutions that have large ownership stakes in many 
case companies, and it is not clear whether foreign investors who make direct investments 
into Finnish equities are as sophisticated in their trading as foreign institutional investors.  
For the other four case companies the results were more of a mixed bag with smaller 
absolute values of momentum scores as follows. For Kone, the median value was -0.01 
and the average was 1.98, representing somewhat momentum trading tendency. For Fin-
nair, the scores average and median scores were 0.31 and 2.40, respectively. In the case 
of Stockmann, the average and median scores were 0.52 and 2.52, respectively, and for 
Saga Furs these scores were 0.00 and -31.78, respectively. In the cases of Kone, Finnair 
and Stockmann the foreign investors had a tendency for momentum trading, supported 
by earlier findings by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) about foreign institutional investors. 
In the case of Saga Furs the foreign investors’ shareholdings were so small and the trading 
activity so little that any conclusion drawn from these scores is very likely ill-informed. 
Monthly analysis 
 
Table 12. The Monthly analysis for all case companies with average and median momen-
tum scores for each investor group. 
Table 12 presents the results for the Monthly analysis, median and average momentum 
scores, for all six investor groups across all case companies. These results will be sum-
marized next, following the same logic as in the High/Low analysis by looking at one 
investor group’s trading behavior at a time. Afterwards, observations of company-specific 
trends in momentum scores will be listed.  
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Median -3.00 1.07 -0.21 -2.52 -0.23 0.35 0.00
Average -3.66 1.19 -1.95 -3.73 0.57 2.71 2.93
Median -1.14 -0.02 -0.16 -0.93 -0.01 -0.17 0.00
Average -1.57 -0.31 -0.48 -1.30 -0.21 -1.54 5.01
Median -1.31 -0.27 -0.39 -1.05 -1.17 -0.28 -0.08
Average -1.94 -0.34 -0.29 -1.21 -2.17 -0.28 -0.91
Median -1.03 -0.10 -0.08 -2.77 0.04 -0.03 -0.31
Average 2.03 -0.08 -7.48 -0.55 -22.79 -0.02 -0.57
Median -0.15 0.09 0.02 -0.19 0.66 0.00 0.00
Average -0.18 0.08 -0.19 -0.18 2.79 0.17 0.04
Median 1.09 -0.31 -0.61 -0.37 0.00 0.23 0.00
Average 3.32 -1.40 30.67 0.74 -426.64 2.13 -10.00
Financial-Insurance
General-Government
Households
Non-Financial
Non-Profit
Rest-World
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Institutional investors’ trading behavior varied greatly across the case companies during 
the study time period. Clear tendency for contrarian investment/trading strategy was pre-
sent in the cases of Nokia, Sampo and UPM-Kymmene. The median and average mo-
mentum scores were -3.00 and -3.66, respectively, for Nokia, -0.21 and -1.95 for Sampo 
and -2.52 and -3.73 for UPM-Kymmene. These scores, especially the ones in the cases of 
Nokia and UPM-Kymmene signalled strong inclination for contrarian trading strategy, 
supported by Dutch data (De Haan and Kakes, 2011). The findings of Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju (2000) regarding Finnish institutional investors support minor preferences for con-
trarian trading as well.  On the contrary, such trading behavior is not supported by 
Wermers (1997) research into mutual funds’ trading strategies in the US.  
Institutional investors had positive momentum scores in the cases of Kone, Stockmann 
and Saga Furs while the scores in the case of Finnair were both positive and negative with 
small absolute values and therefore Finnair scores were deemed inconclusive. This mo-
mentum style trading in Kone, Stockmann and Saga Furs was not very strong as the me-
dian momentum scores were 1.07, 0.35 and 0.00, respectively, while the average momen-
tum scores were 1.19, 2.71 and 2.93, respectively. Such momentum trading behavior of 
institutional investors is supported by research about mutual funds operating in the US 
and Germany (Wermers, 1997; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Baltzer et al., 2018) while few pa-
pers report the contrary (De Haan and Kakes, 2011, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). 
The Finnish Government had negative average and median momentum scores across all 
case companies except for Saga Furs. For Saga Furs, the median and average values were 
0.00 and 5.01, respectively. For all other case companies the scores were rather small by 
absolute value, however, all were negative representing contrarian trading behavior. The 
finding of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) support the finding that the government has a 
tendency for contrarian trading. These scores are not fully representative of the Govern-
ment’s trading actions as some investments have been transferred during the study time 
period into Solidium, the government-owned investment vehicle which is listed under the 
Non-Financial investor group category. This distorts the reality to some extent and most 
definitely weakens this method’s power of assessing government trading behavior. 
Household investors have been categorized in the Finnish marketplace as contrarian trad-
ers by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). This study finds strong support to their view as 
every median and average momentum score calculated for household investors is of neg-
ative value, representing contrarian trading behavior. The highest values in this study 
were found in the cases of Nokia, UPM-Kymmene and Finnair, all greater than 1.00 in 
absolute value. In the other 4 case companies, the median and average momentum scores 
were also negative, however smaller than 1.00 in absolute value. The smaller absolute 
values, compared to say those of institutional investors, might represent the fact that 
household investors are less sophisticated than institutional investors and the investment 
decisions might therefore be more diverse in general, leading to less herding behavior by 
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household investors. This contrarian trading style of household investors is supported by 
research into German markets (Baltzer et al., 2018).  
In the case of Non-Financial companies’ investor group the momentum scores are nega-
tive, representing contrarian trading strategy, in all cases except the median momentum 
score for Finnair (which was -0.04) and the average score for Nokia (which was 2.03). 
All of the values were rather small with the exception of Nokia, where the median mo-
mentum score was -1.03 and the average score 2.03. Non-Financial group’s trading be-
havior is interesting, however the findings are distorted by the fact that the majority of 
the case companies are belong to the group and therefore their share buyback programs 
are included in the group’s trading data. This is why the findings in the case of Nokia are 
problematic as the majority of this trading activity is driven by the company’s share buy-
back program and therefore any conclusion about the investor group’s behavior drawn 
from this data is most likely imaginary and not supported by the actual data about the 
group’s trading behavior.  
Non-Profit investor group’s momentum scores were of very small values with the excep-
tion of Finnair, where the median and average scores were 0.66 and 2.79, respectively, 
representing significant momentum trading behavior, which is not supported by past re-
search into the Finnish marketplace (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). The investor group 
has been described in past literature (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000) as more sophisticated 
than households in Finland as well as less contrarian than household investors, which is 
supported by the momentum scores reported in Table 12.  
Foreign investors’ momentum scores were a mix of contrarian and momentum trading 
strategies with both positive and negative values. Due to the small shareholdings, the 
average values of momentum scores were extremely high in 3 cases, 30.67 for Sampo,  
-426.64 for Finnair and -10.00 for Saga Furs. Foreign trading in Nokia and Stockmann 
was momentum based with median and average scores of 1.09 and 3.32, respectively, for 
Nokia and 0.23 and 2.13 for Stockmann.  In the case of Kone, the median and average 
momentum scores were -0.31 and -1.40, respectively, representing contrarian trading ten-
dency. The momentum trading tendency for foreign investors has support from past re-
search into the Finnish market (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). Foreign investors repre-
sented by the Rest-World investor group had small shareholdings in the case companies 
during the study time period. One reason for this is the fact that nominee shareholdings 
were left out of the study and therefore all major foreign institutions shareholdings are 
not included in the study and the data is limited to direct foreign investments mainly done 
by foreign household investors.  
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6. RESULTS 
In this chapter, the observations of data analysis will be further explored and explained. 
First, ownership structures and their variations across companies and their evolvement 
over time will be discussed. Next, investor group behavior over time will be discussed. 
For these results there exists two separate statistics in the data analysis – one containing 
all six investor groups trading behavior on a monthly basis when compared to monthly 
returns and the other looking at three investor groups trading behavior on only two months 
every calendar year, the one where an annual high of the stock price is set and another 
where an annual low of the stock price is set. 
Ownership structures of all selected case companies remained rather stable during the 
over two decade long time frame, exceptions in terms of time period being Kone, which 
was listed as a stand-alone company in May 2005 and Sampo, for the data set begins in 
July 1997. Using the ownership structure framework established in Chapter 2.1 the study 
resulted in the following results:  
 Nokia had dispersed ownership for the whole time period 
 Kone had family ownership for the whole period with Herlin family controlling 
the company 
 Sampo had dispersed ownership for the majority of the time period with the Finn-
ish Government holding a majority stake for a short time period of time (of all A 
shares) and for the majority of the time period the Government held the majority 
of all non-nominee shares with the help of Solidium, the government investment 
vehicle 
 UPM-Kymmene had dispersed ownership for the whole time period 
 Finnair was government-owned for the whole time period as it has been deemed 
a strategic holding by the Finnish government 
 Stockmann had dispersed ownership for the whole time period 
 Saga Furs had dominant ownership for the whole time period, dominant owner 
being the Finnish Fur Breeders Association, a non-profit organization 
The Finnish government has been a shareholder in all case companies, however the own-
ership stakes have varied in size greatly. The government has been the dominant and/or 
controlling stockholder in two of the seven companies, Sampo and Finnair during the 
study time frame. However, at the end of the time frame the government remains a ma-
jority stockholder in Finnair for strategic reasons while the government has sold the ma-
jority of its equity holdings in Sampo, holding less than 10 % of the total equity directly 
as of December 2016 and more through Solidium, the government investment vehicle.  
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Nokia, UPM-Kymmene and Sampo have been very popular investment choices for do-
mestic institutional investors with ownership stakes averaging 11.1, 15.0 and 12.6 per-
cent, respectively, over the study time period. Household investors have shown a clear 
preference for Nokia, UPM-Kymmene and Saga Furs with average ownership stakes of 
39.6, 38.6 and 30.5 percent, respectively, over the study time period. One must note that 
all of these ownership stakes are of total non-nominee shareholdings as nominee share-
holdings are completely excluded from this research. The majority equity stake held by 
the Finnish government in Finnair limits the ownership share of all other investor groups 
and this might also make institutional investors shun away from the company due to 
strong government interests and control through the government holding the majority of 
the company’s equity. This explains the steady ownership base of Finnair in terms of 
different investor groups’ ownership stakes. 
There was plenty of variation in the case companies’ ownership structure evolvement 
during the time period observed. Sampo had enormous variation due to the fact that it 
merged with Leonia, a government-owned bank resulting in a large increase in the Finnish 
Government’s ownership stake in the company. Over time, this effect was diluted as the 
Finnish Government disposed the majority of its stake in the company and reorganized 
some of it into Solidium, the government’s investment vehicle listed as a Non-Financial 
company.  Stockmann’s ownership structure had a major step-function change due to a 
directed share issue, explained in detail in Chapter 5.2. Both UPM-Kymmene and Nokia 
had active share buyback programs during the study time period which created statistical 
artefacts in Chapter 5.2 and appeared as variance in the ownership which was not actual 
but rather artificial. Kone, on the other hand, retained very stable ownership structure 
during the time period, which was shorter than for the other case companies. This might 
be explained by the Herlin family acting as the controlling shareholder of the company 
through a dual share class structure of the company. 
Share buyback programs distort the picture of Non-Financial companies’ ownership 
stakes (and institutional investors’ stake in Sampo) in many of the case companies, which 
is why findings in this group’s ownership stake variance are not of major scientific value 
or interest. Mergers and acquisitions using equity financing resulted in major step-func-
tion changes in the case companies’ ownership structures, mainly the Alcatel-Lucent mer-
ger by Nokia, Leonia and Mandatum mergers by Sampo and Haindl acquisition by UPM-
Kymmene.  
Foreign ownership, looked at in this study as the Rest-World group, was very small in all 
companies due to the research methodology, where all nominee shareholdings and trans-
actions were excluded from the data set and therefore foreign ownership of the case com-
panies seems artificially small in Chapter 5.2. The actual ownership of Nokia, for an ex-
ample, is in the hands of foreign institutions as over 80 percent of all Nokia shares are 
held in the nominee arrangement, where the true owner of the shares is hidden behind an 
intermediary. 
67 
The most significant findings from the data analysis of Chapters 5.2 and 5.3 were that 
household investors tend to follow contrarian trading strategies across all case companies 
and domestic institutional investors follow both, contrarian and momentum trading strat-
egies, depending on the case company, during the study time period. This is in line with 
previous research into investor behavior in the Finnish stock market (Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju, 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) as well as Dutch research about institutional 
investors’ trading behavior (De Haan and Kakes, 2011). Grinblatt and Keloharju’s find-
ings about the Finnish Government using contrarian trading strategy was confirmed and 
no support was found for their claim of non-profits pursuing contrarian trading strategies, 
perhaps because the data sample used in this study was rather limited in terms of non-
profit trading. However, past research (Wermers, 1997; Grinblatt et al., 1995) into US 
mutual funds trading strategies does not support this study’s findings about institutional 
investors trading strategies.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The case companies ownership structures remained stable during the study time period 
with a few major step-function changes related to major equity issues, mergers and ac-
quisitions as well as ownership reorganizations. This study shed light on the case compa-
nies ownership structure throughout the study time period. As a conclusion regarding the 
ownership structures’ and their evolvement, the variance was very company- and event-
specific and the variability in ownership was not very high even in those cases, where 
multiple special events affecting ownership structure were present during the study time 
period.  
Trading patterns of different investor groups had tendencies different from one and an-
other and such findings have academic support from papers (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; De Haan and Kakes, 2011; Baltzer et al., 2018) 
studying the Finnish, Dutch and German marketplace while the findings of this study are 
contrary regarding institutional investors’ trading behavior compared to research 
(Wermers, 1997; Grinblatt et al., 1995) in the US marketplace. Domestic investors seem 
to exhibit contrarian trading patterns more so than momentum trading patterns, which are 
exhibited more by foreign institutional investors. The trading of foreign institutional in-
vestors was left out of this study, however the above statement can be made due to every 
trade having two parties involved, a buyer and a seller and when one exhibits contrarian 
strategy, the other will exhibit momentum strategy by this study’s definition. 
This research employed data about non-nominee shareholdings and therefore the charts 
and tables presented in the study do not represent the total amount of shares outstanding 
by each case company, but rather the equity held by domestic investors and corporations. 
This results in a non-complete picture of corporate control, so the results should not be 
employed in any way to establishing views on control exerted through voting rights in the 
case companies. 
As citizens and future retirees everyone in the society should be concerned about their 
savings being employed into the stock market with an optimal strategy in order to first 
and foremost protect buying power in the future whether that is through their personal 
savings through private investing or via an investment vehicle. The most relevant savings 
(or investments) for an average Finnish citizen being their pension funds that are being 
managed by the large pension funds, one would indeed hope that the pension funds would 
follow an optimal strategy in capital allocation, or investment, decisions. This research 
suggests that Finnish institutions employ both a contrarian strategy and a momentum 
strategy in the Finnish stock market, depending on which case company was being stud-
ied. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that foreign institutional investors achieved 
superior returns in the Finnish market using momentum strategies and support for such 
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claim has been documented in the US market as well (Wermers, 1997). In theory, pension 
funds should have very long-term investment horizons and contrarian strategy should 
work better than a momentum strategy if used in long-term investing contrary to trading 
activities where momentum strategies have been proven successful.  
Poor long-term pension fund returns have somewhat plagued the Finnish pension system 
and this might be a result of poor investment decisions in terms of assets chosen for in-
vestment as well as in terms of asset classes chosen for investment. Pension funds have a 
large, long-term funding constituency, which would achieve superior performance if risk-
ier assets such as stocks were chosen to the pension fund portfolio more often than assets 
such as fixed income, for an example government bonds, which often provide less vola-
tility combined with poorer returns. A better pension system would result in better results 
in terms of investment returns. Having any part of the pension funds employed into bonds 
is irrational due to the large gap between expected return rates of stocks and bonds in an 
operating environment where pension funds could and should be employed with a long-
term strategy with optimal returns targeted over a multi-decade time period instead of 
focusing on quarterly or annual results of the pension funds. A great example of this is 
the Singaporean system, where another benefit is the savings/investment rate of the citi-
zens being similar to Chinese rates on top of a rational investment strategy employing the 
funds provided by the taxpayers in Singapore. Every taxpayer in Finland should be con-
cerned about the current system and its sustainability, as we could and should do better.  
7.1 Meeting the objectives & assessment of the limitations and 
quality of the study 
Meeting the objectives 
The research posed three questions which were investigated through data analysis. One 
of them concerned the ownership structure of the case companies, another the evolvement 
of these structures and the third was about investor groups’ behavioral tendencies. An-
swering these questions was successful, however the findings were not specifically out of 
line with previous global research into ownership structure and investor behavior. The 
three research questions will be repeated next along with findings of this study. After this 
a short discussion about the answers to these questions will be presented. This chapter 
will end with discussion about the limitations and the quality of the study.  
What is the ownership structure of Finnish public companies like?  
The case companies’ ownership structures varied greatly.  Institutional investors had a 
clear preference for large market capitalization firms during the study period, supported 
by previous research (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). As Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) 
described, the Finnish marketplace has plenty of diversity in ownership structures of com-
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panies, which was supported by the data used in this study. Ownership of the case com-
panies was very diverse, with four of them being diffusely owned, one being family-
controlled (Kone), one being controlled by non-profit associations (Saga Furs) and one 
being government-controlled (Finnair).  
How does this ownership structure evolve over time?  
The ownership structure has some variance over time, however the ownership stakes held 
by different investor groups at the beginning and at the end of the study period were very 
similar to each other. Government- and family-owned companies seem to have more sta-
ble ownership structures with smaller free floats of the companies’ equity contributing to 
this stability. Smaller companies, namely Saga Furs in this case study, seem to have more 
volatile ownership structures even though it was controlled by non-profit associations for 
the whole study time period.  
Do investor groups have differing, systematic tendencies from one and another in terms 
of their buying and selling decisions related to the case companies? 
This study found that domestic investors have a significant tendency for employing con-
trarian trading strategies and the degree of such tendency is inversely related to investor 
sophistication as documented by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) in the Finnish stock mar-
ket. Household investors tend to act in a contrarian manner in the marketplace in each of 
the case companies respect, while domestic institutional investors had differing tenden-
cies depending on the case company in question, employing both contrarian and momen-
tum based trading strategies. Non-Financial companies’ trading behavior could not be 
reliably identified during the research due to share buyback programs and the retirement 
of the bought back shares distorting the view on the investor group’s trading patterns. 
One can make a strong hypothesis with this paper’s findings that foreign institutional 
investors employ a momentum strategy in the Finnish marketplace, as reported by 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). 
Discussion of the results 
The study was successful in assessing the ownership structure of the case companies over 
a long time period. The resulting view on ownership structure is not perfect in any way 
due to various reasons that compromise the exact structure, for an example the exclusion 
of nominee holdings or an estate’s assets and their redistribution. However, the picture 
given by the study should reflect the actual ownership and investor groups’ trading pat-
terns somewhat well given the restrictions due to the inability to look at nominee share-
holdings and the changes within them. The results shed light to the Finnish capital market 
environment and are in line with past research with differing ownership structures for 
companies of different sizes and in different businesses.  
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Evolvement of the ownership structure was found to be rather small, or the ownership 
structures seemed to be rather stable over time. In the long-term there were only minor 
changes and some step-function changes were found in cases where the company in ques-
tion completed large directed issues of equity for balance sheet strengthening and acqui-
sition purposes. Stock splits are common practice in the Finnish marketplace and these 
did not have major effects on ownership structures. As explained by companies’ manage-
ments, rationale behind stock splits seem to be pleasing the financial industry incumbents 
preferences by increasing the liquidity of the equity in question. 
This research identified trends or behavioral biases present in the Finnish marketplace in 
multiple investor groups. Household investors were found to be contrarians and finance 
and insurance companies to be both, contrarian-based and momentum-based traders in 
terms of monthly trading behavior compared to monthly returns. Here, it was found that 
European research findings could be extended to the Finnish market, while some findings 
from the US market could not be extended to the Finnish market.  
Limitations and quality of the study 
This study was in no terms comprehensive in its study of ownership structure changes 
and investor trading behavior. To a large part that is a result from the monthly snapshots 
of ownership structure and changes in it. Another major limitation was the fact that nom-
inee shareholdings, which represent often large ownership holdings, were not accounted 
for in the study. Various equity issues had a negative effect on the completeness of the 
data analysis due to many exclusions in terms of monthly data. Large ownership restruc-
turings such as that of Sampo’s and major acquisitions where equity was used as currency 
made it impossible to use these months’ data in the analysis. 
Quality of the data has been found not to be perfect, yet it is rather close to being true. 
Unfortunately, 100 % true and complete data is not often available and this study was 
completed with high precision and care utilizing the available data.  The data analysis  
was not very rigorous in terms of mathematical and statistical computations used. There-
fore the study quality might be compromised in quantitative terms, however this does not 
make the study’s findings irrelevant in terms of qualitative findings. Choosing to analyze 
monthly data limited the scope and findings of the study as analyzing daily returns would 
have provided the study with a more detailed picture, especially into trading and less so 
into long-term investment decisions, via more data points for quantitative analysis. 
After diligent analysis, investor age by birth decade was found to have no significant 
effects on any metrics that were identified and therefore this data was not taken advantage 
of during the final data analysis of the study. There could have been many major error 
sources in separating holdings by investor birth decade especially due to estates of past 
investors being redistributed to the next of kin. Keloharju et al. (2012) have found signif-
icant wealth effects attributable to age and these were supported by the data but a decision 
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was made to not complete more extensive research into this variable. It should be rather 
obvious that older individuals have had more years to accumulate savings and reinvest 
dividends than younger individuals as well as having higher earning power due to having 
more working experience and therefore rare skills prized more by the marketplace than 
those possessed by younger individuals.  
Volatility was not included as a variable in the data analysis despite the study citing many 
papers regarding volatility and its linkage to investor groups, namely institutional inves-
tors. Including volatility in the data analysis would have been interesting, yet looking at 
this option proved to be more of a distraction from the key findings, behavioral biases of 
investor groups. Therefore, the variable was left out of the study and this resulted in lim-
ited findings and underutilization of the potential of this particular data set. 
7.2 Future research 
This thesis combined many sources of stock market information into one study and mul-
tiple future research subjects were identified during the study. Many areas of the available 
data were left rather untouched giving future researchers the opportunity to build on past 
research by looking at other variables and perhaps by adding additional variables to the 
research equation. 
One of the major variables that was left out of this research was volatility. Including vol-
atility in a similar study would present many opportunities for new findings and extension 
of past research into the Finnish market environment. A PhD project involving volatility 
as a variable is very conceivable and interesting in terms of scientific discovery. Market 
and company-specific volatility would be interesting variables to introduce into a similar 
research as companies do have differing volatilities in the marketplace – perhaps investor 
groups and their involvement in the company ownership structure could be tied to the 
company’s equity volatility compared to that of the Finnish market as a whole. Another 
similar topic would be to repeat Barrot et al. (2016) study in the Finnish marketplace and 
see if individual investors did provide liquidity during the dot-com and the financial crisis 
and whether they were compensated for doing so. 
Another very interesting topic would be individual investor trading and trading decision-
making. Matti Keloharju of Aalto University has published multiple interesting and ex-
cellent papers around the subject and future research opportunities can still be found in 
this field. One interesting topic would be to further look into different age groups invest-
ment and trading behavior in the Finnish marketplace. Another such topic would be to 
look at pension funds’ investment records and comparing them to household investors 
and market indices – this would provide a great exercise at looking at how great of a cost 
the current pension system has had on the taxpayers overall wealth in Finland when pen-
sion funds’ investment returns would be compared with those of market indices of total 
return in indices such as S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite (both US), DAX (Germany) or 
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OMXH (Finland). The opportunity cost incurred by the taxpayers could be enormous and 
would perhaps give a push for the public discussion towards reform. If the past record of 
politics is used as reference, the likelihood of reform of the pension system towards a 
more efficient and rational is pretty low. 
Looking at different industries and ownership structures within same industries could 
present another interesting research area. Here, one could look at differences in manage-
ment and strategy and if they correlate with ownership structure dynamics. One might use 
a research hypothesis that institutional investors would prefer strategies of outside inno-
vation obtained through M&A activities. Another research topic in this field would be 
insider ownership and its correlation with future results in the Finnish marketplace. In the 
same area, one might study whether different ownership structures result in different rates 
of growth in book value, market capitalization, revenues and/or net profits over a long 
time frame or whether a major change in ownership structure will result in major changes 
in the abovementioned variables, for an example in cases where governments have di-
vested large ownership stakes to other investor groups. 
This thesis raised more questions than it answered and future research into many ques-
tions posed here would be warranted. Therefore, one might argue that the study was un-
successful or that the study was successful depending on how success is defined – raising 
new questions or answering questions made. Data-driven research and analysis should 
provide our decision-makers both in politics and pension funds to make smarter decisions 
and pursue a more rational long-term strategy for the benefit of the people and society as 
a whole. 
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